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PLEAS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Lester B. Orfield*
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, entitled "Pleas,"
provides as follows:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent
of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a
plea of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determin-
ing that the plea is made voluntarily with an understanding of the
nature of the charge. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court
refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails
to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
I. HISTORY OF D.AFTYING OF RULE 11.
The first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, dated September
8, 1941, provided in Rule 7(a): "The plea shall be not guilty, nolo contendere
or guilty." Rule 8(b) (2) provided that if the defendant does not plead noto
contendere or guilty, he shall plead not guilty or move to dismiss the accusa-
tion. If the defendant wishes to deny directly and without affirmative defense
that he did the act charged, he, or his counsel in his presence, shall enter orally
in open court his plea of not guilty. If the defendant wishes in addition to assert
an affirmative defense, he or his counsel shall file a motion to dismiss the accusa-
tion. The Committee for the Southern District of Florida proposed that all other
pleas be abolished; that a defendant be permitted to plead guilty by so announc-
ing in court, and that the court be empowered forthwith to accept such and to
enter judgment. Judge Taylor of the Sixth Circuit complained that many
defendants plead not guilty at arraignment and then change their plea on the
date of the trial. He discouraged this by announcing at the time of arraignment
that such a change might bring additional punishment. But he admitted that
often the lawyer rather than the defendant was at fault. The Committee for the
Western District of Oklahoma suggested that if a defendant refuses to plead the
* Professor of Law, Indiana University; Member, United States Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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court must then enter a plea of not guilty for him; and that special pleas should
be filed within ten days after a plea of not guilty but without withdrawal of the
not guilty plea. Mr. A. W. Trice of the Committee for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma suggested that a plea of not guilty be made in writing prior to or at
the time of arraignment, or orally in open court at the time of arraignment, or
within 24 hours thereafter. The Committee for the Eastern District of New
York suggested a rule to permit defendants charged with felonies or misdemeanors
to plead guilty to a petty offense if the United States Attorney and the court
approve. The Committee for the Western District of Oklahoma would permit a
plea of nolo contendere up to the time the jury is sworn; when it is entered the
United States Attorney must present to the court a statement of facts which he is
prepared to prove and the court will then determine the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence. Frederick F. Faville of Iowa would abolish the plea. The Judicial Con-
ference of the Second Circuit discussed the plea and concluded that it had
more friends than had been supposed.
Rule 30(a) of the second draft, dated January 12, 1942, provided: "The
plea upon arraignment shall be not guilty, nolo contendere, or guilty." Further-
more no other pleas "shall be recognized." Rule 51 (c), entitled "Pleas," pro-
vided: (1) that defendant on arraignment may ask the court for more time to
secure counsel or otherwise prepare his defense, or may plead; (2) that the court
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere; (3) that if the de-
fendant stands mute or pleads evasively, or if the defendant is a corporation and
fails to appear, a plea of not guilty shall be entered; (4) that if the defendant
pleads not guilty he shall at the same time file any motions asking the court for
orders either disposing of the written accusation or bringing the case on to trial;
and, (5) that the arraignment or plea shall be entered of record, but the failure
of the record to show the entry shall not constitute a defect or error if the de-
fendant is not shown by the record to have objected to proceeding to trial
without arraignment or plea.
Rule 51 (b) of the third draft, dated March 4, 1942, made a number of
changes in the former Rule 51(c). Under subsection (1) no provision was
made for the defendant's asking for more time at his arraignment to secure
counsel or otherwise prepare his defense. Under subsection (4) if the defendant
pleads not guilty he shall within a reasonable time fixed by the court file any
motions for orders with respect to the written accusation. The former sub-
section (5) on entry of record of arraignment and plea was omitted.
The fourth draft, dated May 18, 1942, was much more concise and much
closer to its final form. Rule 15(a) provided:
The defendant may plead guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere.
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or of nolo con-
tendere. If the defendant refuses to plead or if the defendant is
a corporation and fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of
not guilty.
Rule 15(a) of the fifth draft, dated June, 1942, made no changes. A
draft, known as Preliminary Draft, dated May, 1942, was submitted to the
Supreme Court for comment, but no comment was made.
Rule 11 of the sixth draft, dated Winter 1942-1943, made no changes in
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substance. The rule now spoke of a defendant instead of the defendant; and
it stated "if a defendant corporation fails to appear" instead of "if the defendant.
is a corporation and fails to appear." For the first time a whole rule was de-
voted to pleas only.
The First Preliminary Draft (seventh committee draft), dated May, 1943,
changed the number of this rule to Rule 12. The first sentence attained its final
form. The second sentence provided that the court shall not accept a plea of
guilty "without first determining that the indictment or information charges an
offense and that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge." The third sentence remained unchanged from the sixth draft.
The following comments were made to the Advisory Committee on the
First Preliminary Draft. Judge George H. Moore of the Eastern District of
Missouri pointed out that the rule was silent as to what shall be deemed sufficient
compliance with the constitutional right of the defendant to assistance of coun-
sel.' The rule should specifically state what shall constitute sufficient advice to
the defendant of this right and evidence of its waiver. John B. Sanborn of the
Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit thought that the second sentence of the
rule contained the inference that it is the duty of the judge to examine the
indictment with the utmost care. This would put too great a burden on the
judge, as, for example, in a long involved mail fraud case involving numerous
counts. The judge should not be required before accepting a plea of guilty to
determine that the indictment or information charges an offense. Judge J. W.
Waring of the Eastern District of South Carolina would require that a plea of
guilty be signed by the defendant so that he may not later claim that he mis-
understood his plea.' Judge A. Lee Wyman of the District of South Dakota
would abolish the plea of nolo contendere, as would the Committee for the
District of South Dakota.' Joseph T. Votava, United States Attorney for the
District of Nebraska, would require the consent of the United States Attorney to
a plea of nolo contendere, as would Robert M. Hitchcock of Dunkirk, New York.
Judge Walter C. Lindley of the Eastern District of Illinois thought it wise to
continue the use of nolo contendere.4 Its availability will often avoid the need
for a new trial. For all practical purposes such a plea is the same as a guilty
plea. It is not important that the rule require consent of the United States
Attorney, as the court will not ignore his recommendation except for good cause.
Thomas J. Morrissey, United States Attorney for the District of Colorado, would
permit a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Stuart H. Steinbrink of New
York would have the rule made clear that a defendant may plead orally in open
court. There was some doubt about this in the existing practice. There might
be still more question under the proposed rules as a plea is denominated a "plead-
ing" in the rule following the rule on pleas. If a corporation fails to appear
steps should be taken by distraint or otherwise to compel its submission to the
1 1 COMMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED CONCERNING THE PRO-
POSED FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 89 (1943).
2 Id. at 90.
3 Id. at 91.
4 Id. VOL. 2 at 387.
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jurisdiction of the court; a plea should be entered only after its appearance or
after it has in some way indicated its submission to the jurisdiction. Judge A.
F. St. Sure of the Northern District of California would omit the second sentence.'
The judge should not have to determine that the indictment or information
charges a crime. This is unnecessary as the rules provide that defenses or ob-
jections to the accusation may be raised by motion before trial. The rule would
be burdensome on the court and would delay the trial. Furthermore the judge
should not have to determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understand-
ing of the nature of the charge. How can a court determine that the defendant
understood the nature of the charge? Sheldon E. Bernstein of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice opposed requiring the court to pass on
whether the accusation charged a crime.' The court should do this even though
the rule is silent. Putting the requirement in the rule might raise the question
whether it is reversible error if the court fails to make a specific and express find-
ing on this point. In effect the court would have to raise a demurrer for the
defendant and then rule on it. The proposed rule would be sound if the de-
fendant does not have counsel. But if the defendant has counsel the proposed
rule is unnecessary as the defendant's counsel could raise the point on demurrer
or motion.
The Second Preliminary Draft (eighth committee draft) is dated February,
1944, and in it Rule 11 attained its final form.
The following comments were made on the Second Preliminary Draft. The
Special Committee of the Oregon State Bar would delete the language "and shall
not accept the plea" from the second sentence.7 Not accepting the plea of
guilty should be discretionary with the court rather than mandatory. There
should be added to the rule the following provision:
The court, upon a request being made by a defendant, shall make
a determination as to whether or not the defendant is mentally
able to enter a plea, to advise his counsel as to the facts, or assist
in his defense.
Whether a defendant has the mental capacity to know whether or not he did
commit a crime should be determined by the court prior to the entry of the
defendant's plea. Judge J. Foster Syme of the District of Colorado would have
the rule require that a plea of guilty be in writing.8 In order to avoid numerous
habeas corpus proceedings being brought by defendants alleging that when they
pleaded guilty they were not properly advised of their constitutional rights,
Judge Syme adopted the practice of having them sign a written statement that
they had been advised of their constitutional rights to trial by jury, appointment
of counsel, and summoning of witnesses. Assistant Attorney General Berge of
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice favored retention of the
plea of nolo contendere. It was useful in anti-trust cases where the crime is
merely malum prohibitum rather than malum in se. Moreover a conviction after
a nolo contendere plea has the same effect as a conviction after a guilty plea,
5 Id. at 388.
6 Id. at 389.
7 Id. VOL. 3 at 41 (1944). Judge A. F. St. Sure took the samne view. Id. at 43.
8 Id. at 42.
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except that the nolo plea is not admissible as prima facie evidence of the pleader's
guilt in a treble damage suit. In anti-trust proceedings often the first step is
indictment and the next civil complaint. Thus, closing out the criminal case is
simply a preliminary to eradicating the improper practices. Use of nolo con-
tendere speeds the process. The policy of the Antitrust Division has been not to
object to the interposition of the plea of nolo contendere. The Committee of the
State Bar of California favored the provision permitting a plea of nolo conten-
dere.
It was felt that there is a definite place in criminal procedure for
a plea which will permit the disposition of an indictment for a felony
by entering a plea which would permit a court to impose some
penalty, but which would not carry with it the results which flow
from the conviction of a felony.9
The Report of the Advisory Committee (ninth committee draft) dated
June, 1944, made no changes. The Supreme Court adopted the rule without
change.
II. FEDERAL PROCEDURE BEFORE RULE 11
A. What Law Applied
Federal law rather than state law was held to apply to the effect of standing
mute." The prosecution in its argument referred to both federal and state law.
However the state law was identical with the federal, hence no clear distinction
was called for. Federal law also applied as to asking the defendant, following a
plea of not guilty, how he would be tried.'1 Even though state law may call for
asking this question, it was not asked in the federal courts. Federal law applied
to whether the record must show arraignment and plea.'2 It also applied to the
question of whether there may be a sentence of imprisonment after a plea of
nolo contendere.' Federal law governed the scope of defenses which may be
raised under the plea of not guilty,'4 and pleading insanity at the time of the
offense.' 5
B. Presence of the Court
The plea should be made in the presence of the court." Possibly there is an
analogous requirement that his retained counsel be present unless his presence
is intelligently waived.
C. Presence of Defendant
Circuit Justice Curtis stated that a federal court may in its discretion allow
one indicted for a misdemeanor to plead and defend by counsel, even though he
9 Id. VOL. 4 at 28.
10 United States v. Hare, 26 Fed. 'Gas. 148, 156 (No. 15304) (C.G.D. Md. 1818); Con-
tra, In re Smith, 13 Fed. 25, 27 (G.G.D. Mass. 1882).
11 United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Gas. 1287, 1305 (No. 15204) (C.O.D. Mass. 1934).
12 United States v. Molloy, 31 Fed. 19, 22 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1887).
13 Hudson v. United States, 9 F.2d 825, 826 (3rd Gir. 1925).
14 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 150 (1931).
15 United States v. Fore, 38 F. Supp. 140, 141 (S.D. Cal. 1941). The procedure in de-
termining present insanity is governed by the common law as there are no federal statutes.
Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (6th Cir. 1899).
16 Saylor v. Sanford, 99 F.2d 605, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 630 (1938).
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is absent. 7 The offense must not be one for which imprisonment must be in-
flicted, and the court must be satisfied of this. The United States Attorney must
consent, or it must appear to the court that he unreasonably withholds his con-
sent. Sufficient cause must be shown for the absence of the defendant, and he
must execute a special power of attorney to counsel to appear and defend in his
absence. In cases where imprisonment is required by law or where it ought to
be imposed, no general rule can be laid down, but the decision will depend on
the circumstances of each case.18
D. Plea by Insane Defendant
A court of appeals has stated that it "is fundamental that an insane person"
cannot "plead to an arraignment." 9  Counsel for the defendant should object
before arraignment, but "the defense may be interposed after araignment in bar
of a trial." At the arraignment counsel may object orally to the court." The
objection may be raised by a motion for a continuance." Since the federal
statutes are silent the common law rules are applied in determining the issue of
present insanity. The court may use a jury, but is not bound to do so," and
there may also be a petition for inquiry into the present condition of the
defendant.2
E. Must the Defendant Plead Personally?
In an early case arising in the Territory of Washington the court stated that
the plea in capital or otherwise infamous cases should be made by the defendant
personally and not merely by his counsel." This was true whether the defendant
pleaded guilty or not guilty. Counsel could not alone enter a plea of not guilty.
The defendant might consider it to his interest to plead guilty and throw himself
upon the mercy of the jury or the court. The court cited the fifth and sixth
amendments to the federal constitution.
To some extent there is case law permitting the attorney for the defendant
to plead guilty for him in his presence even when the sentence is imprisonment.
Where the attorney asked the defendant, who had already pleaded nolo con-
tendere, if he wished to plead guilty on condition that the court delay imposition
of sentence, and the defendant replied, "What can I say?" and the attorney in
his own words and in the presence of defendant, who made no protest, entered a
plea of guilty, the plea of guilty was valid.2 5 The crime was willful and fraudu-
17 United States v. Mayo, 26 Fed. Cas. 1230 (No. 15754) (C.C.D. Mass. 1853).
18 United States v. Leckie, 26 Fed. Cas. 906, 907 (No. 15583) (D. Mass. 1854).
19 Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899). See also Robinson v. John-
ston (50 F. Supp. 774, 776 (N.D. Cal. 1943); Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707, 709 (9th
Cir. 1939); Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Administration,
53 YALE L.J. 684, 687 (1944).
20 Youtsey v. United States, supra note 19, at 942.
21 Youtsey v. United States, supra note 20, at 938. See United States v. Boylen, 41 F.
Supp. 724 (D. Ore. 1941).
22 Youtsey v. United States, supra note 21, at 943; United States v. Fore, 38 F. Supp. 140,
141 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
23 United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
24 Elick v. Washington Territory, 1 Wash. Territ. 138 (1861). This case was cited and
quoted favorably in State v. Walton, 50 Ore. 142, 91 Pac. 490, 493 (1907). See also ANNOT.
13 L.R.A. 811 (1908).
25 United States v. Dennison, 89 F.2d 696, 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 709
(1937).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
lent evasion of income taxes, and the sentence was imprisonment. The court did
not distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors.
In a narcotics trial, while summing up to the jury, the defendant's attorney
said that the defendant was guilty of the second count. The trial judge then
asked whether the defendant pleaded guilty to which the attorney replied in the
affirmative. In charging the jury the judge declared that the defendant had
pleaded guilty to the second count and withdrew it from their consideration. The
verdict was guilty on the first count. The defendant was sentenced to ten years
upon the first count and five years on the second count, the sentences to run
concurrently. Upon appeal the defendant claimed that he did not plead guilty
on the second count. The plea was held sufficient"6 but this is open to serious
question.27 Even when the defendant personally pleads, the court should
ascertain that the defendant understands the consequences of his action. The
defendant may not understand the effect of his attorney's action. His mere
silent acquiescence does not necessarily show understanding. It should not be
assumed that he understood, particularly when serious offenses involving long
prison terms are charged to the defendant. The requirement that the defendant
plead personally seems a corollary to the general rule that the defendant be
present during the trial.
F. Waiver of Plea
In 1887 the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Missouri took the view
that the record need not show arraignment and plea.2" The court relied on the
federal statute providing that no proceeding shall be affected by "any defect or
imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the
defendant." The result might be different if in fact the defendant went to trial
supposing the charge was one thing, and after the testimony was introduced he
discovered for the first time that he was being tried for a different thing. But
such facts did not appear in this case. However, in 1896 the Supreme Court
held that the record must show that the defendant was formally arraigned or
that he pleaded to the indictment.29 Whether the defendant pleads or does not
plead to an infamous crime is not a matter of form.30  It is the prevailing rule
in this country and in England, at least in cases of felony, that a plea to the in-
dictment is necessary before trial and this fact must appear a~ffirmatively from
the record. 1 In the absence of a plea there is nothing for the jury to try. As to.
infamous crimes the courts are not at liberty to guess that a plea was made by or
for the accused or what the nature of the plea was." Due process of law "re-
quires that the accused plead, or be ordered, to plead, or, in a proper case, that
26 United States v. Moe Liss, 105 F.2d 144, 145 (2d Cir. 1939). This case was cited
favorably in United States v. Colonna, 142 F.2d 210, 213 (3rd Cir. 1944). But in the latter
case the defendant was specifically asked by the court whether he understood the plea and
answered in the affirmative.
27 40 COLUm. L. Rav. 722, 725 (1940). See also Cooke v. Swope, 28 F. Supp. 492, 493
(W.D. Wash. 1939).
28 United States v. Molloy, 31 Fed. 19, 21 (E.D. Mo. 1887).,
29 Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 636-38 (1896).
30 Id. at 637.
31 Id. at 642.
32 Id. at 644.
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a plea of not guilty be filed for him, before his trial can rightfully proceed."3 3
Three justices, Peckham, Brewer, and White dissented. They were satisfied that
in fact the defendant had been arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The fact that
a jury was summoned shows that there was a plea of not guilty. Even if the
defendant had not in fact been formally arraigned or had not in terms pleaded,
he waived these protections by proceeding to trial without objection. There was
no real injury to the defendant, hence the statute doing away with formal defects
should apply.
Following this decision a court of appeals held that, while arraignment may
be waived, "the plea is absolutely essential." 3 4 The rule as to plea is true as to
misdemeanors as well as felonies. Another court while upholding waiver of
arraignment in misdemeanor cases nevertheless did not do so as to plea. 5 Where
a defendant was tried without having interposed a plea to any of the counts of
the indictment except one, to which he pleaded not guilty, the issue made by
such a plea is the only one on which he can be tried."8 Where the defendant
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, but then obtained leave to withdraw his
plea and file a motion to quash and a demurrer to the indictment, which were
later overruled, and the defendant went to trial, another plea of not guilty is not
necessary, as the withdrawal of the plea of not guilty was merely provisional.
The Supreme Court in a second case adhered to its earlier decision, again
in a federal criminal case, that in capital and otherwise infamous crimes "both
the arraignment and plea are matters of substance, and must be affirmatively
shown by the record." 3  But finally in 1914 in a state court case the Supreme
Court held that when, on a second trial after grant of a motion for new trial,
there was no arraignment or plea but defendant went to trial without objection
he had waived arraignment and plea. 9 There had been arraignment and plea
on the first trial, so that on its facts the decision was narrow in scope. The court
held that there was no violation of due process of law. The Crain case laying
down a rule against waiver in federal criminal cases was overruled.
Following this decision a number of lower federal court decisions found a
binding waiver. One case held that the Supreme Court decision applied to
federal criminal cases as well as state, and that it applied even though the issue
33 Id. at 645. The court did not refer to or expressly overrule United States v. Molloy,
31 Fed. 19 (E.D. Mo. 1887). But that case was said to have been overruled by the Crain
case, in United States v. Aurandt, 153 N.M. 292, 107 Pac. 1064, 1066 (1910). The Crain
case was thought at the time to represent the weight of authority of the state courts. 21 HAav.
L. REv. 217 (1908). Arraignment and plea must precede the impaneling and swearing of
the jury. United States v. Aurandt, 153 N.M. 292, 107 Pac. 1064, 1065 (1914).
34 Shelp v. United States, 81 Fed. 694, 701 (9th Cir. 1897). In this case there was an
affirmance as to a defendant who waived arraignment and pleaded not guilty; but a reversal
as to another defendant when the record showed neither arraignment nor plea.
35 United States v. McKnight, 112 Fed. 982, 983 (W.D. Ky. 1902). See 3 DR PAUL L.
REv. 105, 109 (1953).
36 Beck v. United States, 145 Fed 625 (2d Cir. 1906) Conviction reversed on appeal).
37 O'Hara v. United States, 1'29 Fed. 551, 556 (6th Cir. 1904).
38 Johnson v. United States, 225 U.S. 405, 409 (1912).
39 Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 645 (1914). A comment on this case in 27
HARv. L. REV. 760 (1914) pointed out that most state courts took the opposite view because
without arraignment and plea there is no issue to try, or because no statute provides for waiver.
But the holding was thought to be correct in principle. In recent years most of the state courts
have adopted the doctrine of waiver. 27 MicH. L. REV. 703 (1929); 3 DE PAUL L. REV. 105,
109 (1953).
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was raised in the trial court.4" There was no reversible error where the de-
fendant, after the government had introduced its evidence and rested, moved for
a directed verdict on the ground that he had not been formally arraigned, and
was then told to plead, and did plead not guilty. In another case an indictment
was presented and four days later it was ordered that the defendant appear for
arraignment at a time five days after the order. The defendant filed a demurrer
which was argued and overruled. Counsel for the defendant and the United
States Attorney then agreed on a date for trial and that the defendant should
plead on that date so as to save a trip. At the opening of the trial the indictment
was read to the jury, and the clerk stated that the defendant had entered a plea
of not guilty. The defendant proceeded to trial without any objection from
him that there had been no arraignment or plea. At the end of the trial his
motion in arrest of judgment was overruled. On appeal no error was found.41
The court of appeals referred to the Supreme Court decision upholding waiver
and the statute on standing mute or refusing to plead. It is too late on motion
for new trial to raise the issue of waiver of arraignment or plea,' 2 and after
judgment it is too late to object that there was no arraignment or plea following
the overruling of a demurrer to the indictment.' Where there was a recital in
the order of the trial court of a plea of not guilty and where there is no express
admission of a failure to arraign by the trial court or by the United States At-
torney, it is doubtful that the lack of arraignment may be established by affidavit.
But even if it could be raised by such an affidavit, it is too late to raise it after
conviction. Where the defendant demurs and his demurrer is overruled and he
is then tried and arraigned only at the close of the government's case, the motion
of the defendant to dismiss need not be granted."'
It may be broadly concluded that where the defendant proceeds to trial
without objection that there was no arraignment or plea, there is a waiver, or at
least there is no reversible error.45
In one case involving nine defendants, six had been tried for what they
claimed to be the same offense. In the present proceeding all nine were ar-
raigned and pleaded not guilty. Later they were given leave to withdraw their
pleas of not guilty and to demur to the indictment. The demurrers were over-
ruled and the trial commenced. Early in the trial, counsel for the six previously
tried called the court's attention to the fact that there were no pleas because of
the withdrawal of the pleas of not guilty, and asked permission to plead. Counsel
for the other three defendants concurred in asking permission to plead. The
trial court did not distinguish the two sets of defendants, and held as to all nine
that their failure to plead after demurrer was a waiver of their right to plead.
On appeal it was held as to the set of six defendants that their convictions be
40 Cornett v. United States, 7 F.2d 531, 532 (8th Cir. 1925).
41 Shidler v. United States, 257 Fed. 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1919). The court also cited State
v. Klosner, 19 N.M. 474, 145 Pac. 679 (1914). As to what constitutes waiver see Ann. Cas.
1917D 831-833.
42 Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1925).
43 Rossi v. United States, 278 Fed. 349, 353 (9th Cir. 1922).
44 United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1929).
45 King v. United States, 25 F.2d 242, 243 (6th air. 1928).
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reversed. 6 They had not by inaction waived their right to plead, but had
offered to plead both not guilty and double jeopardy, and they had repeatedly
objected during trial. They were deprived of their opportunity to defend under
a proposed plea of double jeopardy. The other three defendants objected too
late. They were not prejudiced as they had not previously been tried and could
not therefore plead double jeopardy.
A state court in effect has pointed out that without an arraignment there is
not likely to be a plea.
Even on the day set for that purpose it is not customary, nor is
it expected, that the defendant shall arise and make such plea known
until directed by either the court or district attorney. He would
have no means of knowing when the particular time of the day
or hour fixed had arrived until his attention should be called to
it in the usual manner. The prisoner, as a rule, would be the last
to risk incurring the court's displeasure by rising unsolicited at an
improper moment to announce he was ready to plead. It is not,
therefore, to be expected that the defendant should make his desire
manifest until called upon to do so.
4 7
When there was an arraignment and plea at the first trial, these need not
be repeated at the subsequent trial or trials of the case where there is a mistrial
or new trial. 8 When after mistrial and before new trial amendments are made
to purely formal parts of certain counts of an indictment, and the defendants are
not rearraigned and do not plead again, even if the irregularity is material, which
is not conceded by the court, it can affect only the counts so amended, and the
error, if error it be, is cured by arrest of judgment on such counts.49 Thus it is
clear that as to some amendments to an indictment another plea will be necessary.
G. Plea of Not Guilty
Justice Harlan thus described the nature of the plea of not guilty:
The plea of not guilty is unlike a special plea in a civil action,
which, admitting the case averred, seeks to establish substantive
grounds of defense by a preponderance of evidence. It is not in con-
fession and avoidance, for it is a plea that controverts the existence
of every fact essential to constitute the crime charged. Upon that
plea the accused may stand, shielded by the presumption of his in-
nocence, until it appears that he is guilty.50
The function of the plea of not guilty is to put the government to its proof
46 Rulovitch v. United States, 286 Fed. 315, 320 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 662
(1923).
47 State v. Walton, 50 Ore. 142, 91 Pac. 490, 492 (1907). The Supreme Court has said,
referring to the statute on standing mute or refusing to plead: "It will be observed that the
word 'arraignment' is used as comprehensively descriptive of what shall precede the plea."
Johnson v. United States, 225 U. S. 405, 411 (1912). In an early case the defendant wished
to plead to a felony without being arraigned, but the court ordered that he be arraigned.
United States v. Pettis, 27 Fed. Cas. 521 (No. 16038) (C.C.D.C. 1831). When he is ar-
raigned for a felony he must be placed in the criminal box or dock and cannot avoid this by
asking to plead only. United States v. Pittman, 27 Fed. Cas. 543 (No. 16053) (C.C.D.C. 1828).
48 United States v. McKnight, 112 Fed. 982, 984 (W. D. Ky. 1902); Garland v. Washing-
ton, 232 U.S. 642, 643 (1914). See ANNOT., 13 L.R.A. 811 (1908); 31 TULANE L. REv. 682
(1957).
49 Gardes v. United States, 87 Fed. 172, 182-83 (5th Cir. 1898). See also 13 L.R.A. 811
(1908).
50 Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 485 (1895). On withdrawal of plea of not guilty
see 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §421 (1936).
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and to preserve the right to defend.5 It does not go to prove that the defendant
is innocent. It is not evidence, it is not testimonial, it is not under oath, and it
is not subject to cross examination.
A plea of not guilty "operates in law as a denial of all charges in the in-
dictment, and puts the government on proof to make out its case on fact and
law."52  Even though there be a confession by the defendant, the government
must introduce other evidence to establish the corpus delicti. A plea of not
guilty puts in issue every allegation of the count to which it is addressed and
places "upon the government in the amplest way the burden of proving every
essential element of the offense charged." 53 The plea of not guilty is to the
charge in the indictment and not to inconsistent matter that may appear on the
back of a good indictment, or in other records of the court.5 4
When on arraignment the defendant pleads not guilty, it is not necessary to
ask the defendant how he will be tried as the Constitution provides for trial by
jury. 5 Moreover trial by battle never existed in the United States.
The defense of entrapment may be raised by a plea of not guilty." Under
the majority view of the United States Supreme Court, evidence of entrapment
must be introduced under the plea of not guilty, and the fact of entrapment
becomes a matter which the jury must determine and finally dispose of, as an
element of its finding of guilty or not guilty." Under the minority view of
Justices Roberts, Brandeis, and Stone the issue of entrapment is for the deter-
mination of the court, at any time and in any manner the issue may be raised;
and on a finding of entrapment the indictment must be quashed and the case
dismissed.
Under a plea of not guilty the defendant may raise the issue of the statute
of limitations.5 8 The rule has been applied to denial of a continuing offense."5
It has also been applied to denial of being a fugitive from justice and to
other extensions of the time limitation."
51 Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
52 United States v. Mayfield, 59 Fed. 118, 119 (E.D. La. 1893). See also United States
v. Sands, 14 F.2d 670 (W.D. Wash. 1926); Lateran v. United States, 93 F.2d 395, 400 (8th
Cir. 1937).
53 Prettyman v. United States, 180 Fed. 30, 42 (6th Cir. 1910).
54 Smith v. United States, 208 Fed. 131, 132 (8th Cir. 1913).
55 United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Gas. 1287, 1305 (No. 15204) (G.C.D. Mass. 1834).
56 United States v. Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214, 215 (D. Conn. 1923); Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 452, reversing 57 F.2d 973 (4th Gir. 1932). See Mikell, The Doctrine
of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245, 247 (1942); 46 HARv. L. REv.
848, 850 (1933); 42 YALE L.J. 803 (1933).
57 42 YALE L.J. 803 (1933).
58 United States v. White, 28 Fed. Gas. 562, 566 (No. 16676) (C.G.D.C. 1836); United
States v. White, 28 Fed. Gas. 568, 569 (No. 16677) (G.C.D.G. 1837); United States v. Six
Fermenting Tubs, 27 Fed. Gas. 1089, 1091 (No. 16296) (D. Wis. 1868); United States v.
Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 179 (1892); United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 610
(1910); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916); Forthoffer v. Swope, 103
F.2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1939).
59 United States v. Kissel, supra note 58; United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72, 78 (1911).
Compare United States v. Brace, 149 Fed. 874, 876 (N. D. Gal. 1907) with United States v.
Raley, 173 Fed. 159, 167 (D. Ore. 1909).
60 United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 179 (1872); United States v. Brace,
143 Fed. 703, 704 (N. D. Gal. 1906); Greene v. United States, 154 Fed. 401, 411 (5th Cir.
1907; United States v. Smith, 13 F.2d 923, 924 (W.D. La. 1926); Gapone v. Aderhold, 65
F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1933).
61 United States v. Clayton-Kennedy, 2 F. Supp. 233, 235 (P. Md. 1933).
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Insanity at the time of the offense may be raised under a plea of not
guilty. 2  The defense of alibi may be raised on a plea of not guilty. 3  The
privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment is a matter of
defense under the general issue of not guilty, and it is improper to use a special
plea to single this question out for determination in advance of trial.6" In
general, when matters set forth in special pleas are mere matters of defense
determinable under the general issue, the plea of not guilty will raise the issue.
A plea of not guilty does not raise the issue of double jeopardy, which must
be pleaded specially.65 A plea of double jeopardy should not be tendered
simultaneously with a plea of not guilty, but should precede it.66 Waiver of
double jeopardy will be implied when the defendant pleads not guilty, and
proceeds to trial, verdict, and judgment without raising such defense.6"
H. Standing Mute
As early as 1818 it was held that on arraignment for a robbery of a mail-
carrier, if the person charged stands mute, the trial will proceed as though he
had pleaded not guilty.6" In this case the defendant at first had entered a plea
of not guilty and a plea to the jurisdiction; had then withdrawn his pleas on
leave obtained from the court; and had then stood mute. The court in granting
leave had assumed that counsel meant to plead other pleas. The court granted
the motion of the United States Attorney to proceed as if the defendant had
pleaded not guilty. The court pointed out that the question was a novel one.
The federal constitution provides that trial of crimes shall be by jury. A defend-
ant may not, by maneuvering, defeat trial by jury. Penance or peine forte et
dure to compel an answer is unknown in the United States.6" The court did not
hold that the case was determined by state law. But if state law, here that of
Maryland, was applied, the result would be the same. While standing mute
would be equivalent to conviction prior to 1809 in Maryland, a statute of 1809
made standing mute equivalent to a plea of not guilty. In a subsequent case
Circuit Justice Story pointed to acts of 1790 and 1825 as providing that stand-
62 United States v. Fore, 38 F. Supp. 140, 141 (S.D. Cal. 1941). See also Whitney v.
Zerbst, 62 F.2d 970, 972 (10th Cir. 1933).
63 Colbeck v. United States, 10 F.2d 401 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 662 (1925).
64 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 150 (1931), reversing 51 F.2d 389 (S. D. Ill.
1930). Territorial jurisdiction of the court is raised by a plea of not guilty. Price v. United
States, 68 F.2d 133, 134 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 632 (1934). See Wright v. United
States, 158 U.S. 232, 238 (1895). The plea of not guilty "enables the defendant to make
any special defense which goes to an original absence of guilt as charged." Price v. United
States, 68 Fed. 133, 134 (5th Cir. 1934).
65 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833). See Brady v. United
States, 24 F.2d 399, 404 (8th Cir. 1928); Rulovitch v. United States, 286 Fed. 315, 319 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 622 (1923).
66 United States v. J. L. Hopkins & Co., 228 Fed. 173, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1912). The two
pleas are not inconsistent, but the plea of jeopardy should be disposed of first. Thompson v.
United States, 155 U.S. 271, 274 (1894).
67 Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1928).
68 United States v. Hare, 26 Fed. Gas. 148, 156 (No. 15304) (C.C.D. Md. 1818). The
English law and its history is described in this case, and also in United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed.
Gas. 1287, 1304-1306 (No. 15204) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
69 But see In re Smith, 13 Fed. 25, 26 (D. Mass. 1882). This case also asserts that Eng-
lish law providing that standing mute results in conviction applied in the United States.
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ing mute is equivalent to pleading not guilty."° The refusal of the defendant to
plead to an information does not destroy the jurisdiction of the court.
1 It is a
mere matter of form to enter a plea of not guilty in such a case. Even if the
statutes were silent on standing mute, the trial would proceed as if the defendant
had pleaded not guilty. No distinction should be taken from muteness arising
ex visitatione Dei or ex malitia. There is a not guilty plea for the latter as well
as the former.
The court may enter a plea of not guilty when a corporation appears in
court and stands mute."2 The record showed that when the case came on for
trial there were appearances for the corporate defendants. The corporation had
appeared at the first trial by attorneys. The court did not rely on the appearance
of two officers of the corporation. It is immaterial that no process had been
served on the corporation. If the attorneys desired to correct the record or to
withdraw their appearances they should have done so.
I. Plea of Guilty
Justice Butler, speaking for the Supreme Court has said: "A plea of guilty
differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial con-
fession; it is itself a conviction.... More is not required; the court has nothing
to do but give judgment and sentence." " A plea of guilty is a judicial con-
fession.' A plea of guilty made at arraignment is a judicial confession of a
higher plane than a plea of guilty before a committing magistrate.. The facts set
forth in the indictment are admitted by the plea."5
When the defendant pleads guilty he thereby in effect waives his right to
trial by jury. Citing Blackstone, Circuit Justice Clifford stated: "Conviction
may accrue in two ways, either by the party confessing his offense and pleading
guilty, or by his being found guilty by the jury." 7' The Supreme Court in a
state court case stated broadly that both at common law and today no jury trial
is necessary when the plea is guilty, even in capital cases." The sixth amendment
does not require jury trial in federal cases when the defendant pleads guilty.
"The accused, by the plea of guilty, eliminated all issues of fact, and left nothing
to be submitted to a jury." 78  When the Supreme Court upheld the validity of
70 United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1305 (No. 15204) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
The former statute, 1 Stat. 119, covered treason and other capital offenses, while the latter,
4 Stat. 118, covered offenses not capital.
71 United States v. Borger, 7 Fed. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1881). Thus prosecutionis under infor-
mations are treated like prosecutions under indictments even though the statute on standing
mute used the word "indicted." Accord, In re Smith, 13 Fed. 25, 26 (D. Mass. 1882), involv-
ing prosecution by complaint.
72 United States v. 'Beadon, 49 F.2d 164, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 625
(1931).
73 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). Accord, United States v. Fox,
130 F.2d 56, 58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666 (1942).
74 Heim v. United States, 47 App. D.C. 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1918).
75 Rachel v. United States, 61 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1932); Langston v. United States,
153 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1946).
76 United States v. Hartwell, 26 Fed. Gas. 196, 201 (No. 15318) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
The court cited 4 BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 362.
77 Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 318 (1892).
78 West v. Gannon, 98 Fed. 426, 428 (6th Cir. 1899). See also Heim v. United States,
47 App. D.C. 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1918); United States v. Harrison, 23 F. Supp. 249, 252
(S.D.N.Y. 1938); Hood v. United States, 152 F.2d 431, 433 (8th Cir. 1946); Cooke v. Swope,
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waiver of trial by jury in federal felony cases it pointed out that "the accused
may plead guilty and thus dispense with a trial altogether." 79 Similarly, on a
plea of nolo contendere there is no trial by jury.' °
May the plea of guilty ever be made prior to arraignment as at the pre-
liminary examination? In 1918 a plea of guilty before the commissioner was
thought not objectionable in a dictum of the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia."1 In 1925 the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit held that
evidence as to admissions and seemingly pleas of guilty made at the preliminary
examination could be admitted at the trial.8 " The Second Circuit held that a
plea of guilty could be made at the preliminary examination and that such a plea
would be received at the trial as freely as any extra-judicial admission of guilt
where not obtained by unfair practice. 3 The defendant could plead not guilty
at the trial without withdrawing his guilty plea before the commissioner.
In 1942 it was held that a plea of guilty should not be received at the pre-
liminary examination.' The privilege against self-incrimination is violated
where defendants charged with robbery are asked at the preliminary examination
whether they plead guilty or not guilty, the defendants being without counsel and
not cautioned as to the consequences of the plea of guilty. Hence such a guilty
plea will not be admitted in evidence at the trial. A guilty plea made at arraign-
ment and later withdrawn is not admissible in evidence. The same rule should
be applied to a plea made at the preliminary examination. Many writers have
thought the holding to be a proper application of the privilege rule.85 It is the
purpose of the privilege to stimulate search for independent evidence and to
preserve the impartiality of the court so that guilt is a matter of objective proof.
Other writers have thought it an improper extension of the privilege and con-
trary to the traditional approach. 6 Justice Rutledge, when later on the Supreme
Court, adhered to his view in the Wood case in a dissenting opinion."
It would seem that a defendant has a right to plead guilty in all criminal
cases including capital cases.8 But a statute may take away such rights in
28 F. Supp. 492, 493 (W.D. Wash. 1939); United States v. Colonna, 142 F.2d 210, 213 (3d
Cir. 1944).
79 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 305 (1930). The Supreme Court had taken
the same position in upholding waiver of jury trials as to petty offenses. Shick v. United States,
195 U.S. 65, 71 (1904). Justice Harlan in his dissent admitted that a guilty plea even to
murder made a jury unnecessary. 195 U.S. 65 at 81-82.
80 United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 623 (1930).
81 Heim v. United States, 47 App. D.C. 485, 488 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 522
(1918). The case involved a plea made at arraignment.
82 Cooper v. United States, 5 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1925). But see Hodge v. United States,
13 F.2d 596, 598 (6th Cir. 1926) refusing to recognize a practical difference between a plea
at preliminary examination and a plea at arraignment.
83 United States v. Adelmann, 107 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1939).
84 Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1942). The present Federal
Criminal Rule 5(c) follows this case.
85 Fuchs, The Judicial Art of Wiley Rutledge, 28 WASH. U.L.Q. 115, 131, 133 (1943);
Levitan, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 34 VA. L. REv. 526, 529-530 (1948); 42 COLUM. L. Rav. 1358
(1942); 30 GEo. L.J. 791 (1942); 28 IOWA L. REv. 136, 139 (1942).
86 Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1940-1945, 59 HARV. L. Rv. 481, 523-26 (1946);
Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. Rv. 1, 24-27 (1949).
87 Canizio v. New York, 327 U. S. 82, 91 (1946).
88 United States v. Dixon, 25 Fed. Cas. 872, (No. 14968) (C.C.D.C. 1807). But the de-
fendant was later permitted to withdraw such plea and to plead not guilty. See also Seadlund
v. United States, 97 F.2d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 1937) where the sentence was death.
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capital cases, such as rape. 9 The Supreme Court has stated:
The Constitution does not compel an accused who admits his guilt
to stand trial .... Legislation apart, no social policy calls for the
adoption by the courts of an inexorable rule that guilt must be
determined only by trial and not by admission.90
Where there are co-defendants it is possible for some to plead guilty and
,some not guilty. If all co-defendants plead not guilty, it is possible for a co-
defendant during trial to plead guilty. But this should be done out of the
presence of the jury. If- the court finds it necessary to explain the absence of
such co-defendant during the remainder of the trial, the court may do so and
may instruct the jury that the fact of such guilty plea should not be considered
as any evidence of guilt of the other defendants.9 '
What is the proper method of pleading where -there are several counts
charging separate offenses in a single indictment? It was held that there was a
binding plea of guilty as to all counts when the record showed that on arraign-
ment the accused "being informed of the charges [plural] in the indictment,
says for his plea that he is guilty thereof in the manner and form as charged
in the indictment." 92
When the defendant gives the judge a written statement when he enters
his plea of guilty, in explanation and in qualification of his plea, such written
statement must be considered as much a part of his plea as was the word
"Cguilty." 93
If the trial judge receives testimony of witnesses relating to the killing after
the defendant has pleaded guilty, this is not an abuse of discretion where the
testimony was received merely for the court's information in acting upon the
plea and imposing sentence.'
The defendant may not attack his guilty plea when he admits that "he was
possessed of his senses and understanding, knew the nature of the case and the
accusation against him, had the advice of counsel, and voluntarily came into
court and entered a plea of guilty." " The Fourth Circuit quoted as a correct
statement the view of the Supreme Court of West Virginia:
Before receiving a plea of guilty in a criminal case, the court should
see that it is made by a person of competent intelligence, freely and
voluntarily, and with full understanding of its nature and effect,
and of the facts on which it is founded.96
89 Green v. United States, 40 App. D.C. 426, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1913). The statute author-
ized the jury to inflict the death penalty.
90 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276 (1942).
91 United States v. Hartenfeld, 113 F.2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1940).
92 Ex parte Farlow, 272 Fed. 910 (N.D. Ga. 1921). See also United States v. Otto, 54
F.2d 277, 280 (2d Cir. 1931).
93 Bergen v. United States, 145 F.2d 181, 188 (8th Cir. 1944). Defendant was allowed
to withdraw his plea.
94 United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777
(1943).
95 West v. Gammon, 98 Fed. 426, 429 (6th Cir. 1899).
96 Fogus v. United States, 34 F.2d 97, 98 (4th Cir. 1929) quoting Nicely v. Butcher, 81
W. Va. 247, 94 S.E. 147, 148 (1917). In Waley v. Johnston, 139 F.2d 117 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 321, U.S. 779 (1944), the court found that there had been no coercion by an F.B.I.
agent. In Hood v. United States, 152 F.2d 431, 433 (8th Cir. 1946), the record showed that
the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered.
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The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court finding
untrue allegations of the defendants that they had been induced to plead guilty
by misrepresentations made by deputy United States marshals as to the punish-
ment that would be given them. Justice Butler, speaking for the Supreme Court,
has said:
Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are
careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made volun-
tarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the con-
sequences. [And] on timely application, the court will vacate a plea
of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or given through
ignorance, fear or inadvertence. 97
A defendant should be permitted to plead guilty only "after being ad-
monished by the court as to its consequences." 9
A plea of guilty is intelligently made even though the defendant pleaded
guilty on advice of counsel and received a longer sentence than both had hoped
would be imposed.99 The same is true where the defendant received a sentence
of imprisonment instead of probation so that he could go into the armed
forces.
100
A plea of guilty entered in complete ignorance of the right to counsel is
not intelligent.'0 ' Such a plea is not a waiver of the right to counsel. But on
habeas corpus the accused must show that he did not know and was not advised
of his constitutional right to counsel, and entered the plea either because he
failed to understand the charge or because he believed that the only alternative
was to go to trial without counsel, and so believing chose to plead guilty, and
would not otherwise have done so.
In a state court case the Supreme Court held that a plea of guilty will not be
regarded as voluntary if procured by trick or artifice, as where defendant, an un-
educated man who was not aided by counsel, received a twenty-year sentence
after he had been tricked into believing that he was pleading guilty to a crime
carrying a much smaller penalty.
0 2
A prisoner who was represented by court-appointed counsel was granted a
hearing on his petition for habeas corpus on the basis of his allegation, which
was not denied by the respondent, that he had been coerced into pleading
guilty."'03 The alleged coercion was by an F.B.I. agent. A plea of guilty coerced
by a federal enforcement officer is no more consistent with due process than a
conviction supported by a coerced confession. Such a plea is not a waiver of the
defense of coercion even though the accused had court-appointed counsel. But
97 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). Accord, Accardi v. United
States, 15 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1926); Woods v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 274 n. 24
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
98 Heim v. United States, 47 App. D.C. 485, (D.C. Cir. 1918).
99 Monroe v. Huff, 145 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1944), habeas corpus denied.
100 Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1945), habeas corpus denied.
101 Parker v. Johnston, 29 F. Supp. 829, 830 (N.D. Calif. 1939) (facts of case held not to
show such ignorance).
102 Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); 20 NEB. L. REv. 173 (1941); 15 TMPLE
L. Q. 441 (1941).
103 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942). The court reversed 124 F.2d 587 (9th
Cir. 1942) which had affirmed 38 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Cal. 1941). The coercion consisted of
a threat to publish false statements and manufacture false evidence that the kidnapped person
had been injured, so that the accused might be hanged.
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where the defendant makes a confession during illegal detention before being
brought before a commissioner, this does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to
accept a voluntary plea of guilty.'
A plea of guilty is not invalid because of coercion where the defendant has
already pleaded nolo contendere and then pleads guilty on condition that his
request for delay in imposition of sentence be granted in order to attend com-
mencement exercises of his son.' The court will refuse to accept a plea of
guilty from a defendant who has been entrapped, and will instead dismiss the
case.
08
After a plea of guilty the defendant is not in a position to raise many
objections to the indictment.' He waives defects in the form of the indict-
ment.' 8 He waives his constitutional right to claim double jeopardy, if any such
claim is available. 9 Upon an indictment simply for murder he may make a
binding plea of guilty of second degree murder."' The defendant waives all
defects that are not jurisdictional,"' and "all defenses other than that the indict-
ment charged no offense under the laws of the United States."'' He also waives
the issue that he did not commit the crime in the district."' If issues of foreign
law are involved he admits them against himself as they are treated as matters of
fact, and he admits all matters of' fact." 4  The only objection that can be made
is "that the indictment fails to describe the various acts intended to be proved
with that reasonable certainty which the law requires to constitute a valid in-
dictment." ' 15 As to other defects a motion in. arrest of judgment will not lie."8
If the defendant fears a second prosecution for the same crime he should ask for
a bill of particulars before pleading guilty."' The defendant by pleading guilty
indicates that the acts charged have been sufficiently identified. The rule that
those defects which would be bad on demurrer are cured by a jury verdict of
104 Blood v. Hunter, 150 F.2d 640, 641 (10th Cir. 1945).
105 United States v. Denniston, 89 F.2d 696, 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 709
(1937).
106 United States v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918).
107 United States v. Chase, 27 Fed. 807 (D. Mass. 1886).
108 Nicholson v. United States, 79 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1935); Weir v. United States,
92 F.2d 634, 635 (11th Cir. 1937); United States v. Harrison, 23 F. Supp. 249, 252 (S.D.N.Y.
1938); Caballero v. Hudspeth, 36 F. Supp. 905, 906 (D. Kans. 1941); Lindsay v. United
States, 134 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1943); Steffer v. United States, 143 F.2d 772, 774 (10th
Cir. 1944).
109 United States v. Harrison, 23 F. Supp. 249, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Caballero v. Hud-
speth, 114 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1940).
110 United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777
(1943).
111 Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir. 1937).
112 Rice v. United States, 30 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1929); Kachmic v. United States, 53 F.2d
312, 315 (9th Cir. 1931); Weatherby v. United States, 150 F.2d 465, 466 (10th Ci. 1945);
Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707, 708 (9th Cir. 1939).
113 Spencer v. Hunter, 139 F.2d 828, 829 (10th Cir. 1944).
114 United States v. Luvisch, 17 F.2d 200, 202 (E.D. Mich. 1927) (writ of error coram
nobis was denied).
115 United States v. Bayaud, 16 Fed. 376, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); Oesting v. United States,
234 Fed. 304, 306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 647 (1917); Nicholson v. United States,
79 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1935); Caballero v. Hudspeth, 36 F. Supp. 905, 906 (D. Kans.
1941).-
116 For example, misjoinder of parties and misjoinders of counts and duplicity cannot be so
raised. Spirou v. United States, 24 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir. 1928).
117 United States v. Bayaud, 16 Fed. 376, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
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guilty is applicable to a plea of guilty."' The statute against setting aside pro-
ceedings for defects of form limits the availability of motion in arrest of judg-
ment.119 Justice Harlan stated in a dissenting opinion that when the defendant
pleads guilty before a lawful tribunal he admits every material
fact well averred in the indictment or information, and there is
no issue to be tried; no facts are to be found; no trial occurs. After
such a plea nothing remains to be done except that the court shall
pronounce judgment upon the facts voluntarily confessed by the
accused.
1 20
The making of a guilty plea does not authorize the court to impose a
legally excessive sentence." By pleading guilty the defendant does not waive
his right to object to an excessive sentence. Where the defendant pleads guilty
and is sentenced under two indictments each of which contained two counts and
all sentences ran concurrently, and one count in each indictment was sufficient
to charge an offense, the defendant is not entitled to release on habeas corpus
on the ground that one count in each indictment did not charge an offense.'22
The defendant may in certain cases appeal from a conviction following a
plea of guilty."' On appeal he may raise the questions whether the statute
under which he is prosecuted is constitutional and whether the accusation
charges a crime."'
A plea of guilty, when offered in evidence against the defendant in another
criminal case, in which the fact admitted by the plea is material, is regarded as
extra-judicial in that case, and tle defendant may show that he did not intend
to enter the plea recorded, or did not know at the time of the nature of the
charge." 5  The same would be true in a civil case. Under the general law of
evidence a guilty plea may be admitted in other trials as an admission against
the defendant entering the plea.' And in any civil action by the government
against the defendant, the doctrine of res judicata may apply and the judgment
entered upon the guilty plea becomes conclusive as to the facts alleged in the
indictment or information."7
J. Plea of Nolo Contendere
A plea of nolo contendere "is allowable only under leave and acceptance
118 United States v. Bayaud, supra note 117, at 383-84.
119 United States v. Chase, 27 Fed. 807, 808 (D. Mass. 1886).
120 Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 72, 82 (1904); accord. Bugg v. Hudspeth, 113
F.2d 260, 261 (10th Cir. 1940). The court must impose the statutory penalty following con-
viction on a plea of guilty. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916) (mandamus lies to
compel sentence).
121 Caballero v. Hudspeth, 36 F. Supp. 905, 906 (D. Kans. 1941). The accused was re-
leased on habeas corpus proceedings. Accord, Bertsch v. Snook, 36 F.2d 155, 156 (5th Cir.
1929); Sprague v. Aderholt, 45 F.2d 790, 791 (N.D. Ga. 1930).
122 Barnett v. Hunter, 138 F.2d 448, 449 (10th Cir. 1943).
123 Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. United States, 210 Fed. 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1914) (failure
to charge a crime); Oesting v. United States, 234 Fed. 304, 306 (9th Cir. 1916).
124 United States v. Ury, 106 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939). See also, Roberts v. United States,
60 F.2d 774, 775 (7th Cir. 1932).
125 Accardi v. United States, 15 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1926).
126 Blumer v. Haft, 78 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 1935); but see, Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 129
F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1942); cf., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 60 F. Supp. 807, 812
(S.D. Calif. 1945).
127 See Local 167, Teamsters Union v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298 (1934).
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by the court.""'2  One court has said that "from a purely technical point of
view a plea of nolo contendere does not admit the allegation of the charge, but
merely says that the defendant does not choose to defend the same." '29  Con-
viction and punishment on such a plea has been characterized as being "in the
nature of a compromise between the prosecutor and the defendant." The
nature of the plea was not changed by the Clayton Act. 1
Negotiations between the defendant and the government resulting in a plea
of nolo contendere are not binding on the court. But the court will approve
where the government could have proceeded initially by a civil action in equity,
and the wrong complained of was merely malum prohibitum and of an economic
nature, and the proceeding was one in which the attainment of a proper under-
standing between the parties was of itself a desirable end. 2
For the purposes of the criminal law a plea of nolo contendere and a plea
of guilty have the same effect.' 33 Circuit Justice Clifford stated that "it is well
settled that the legal effect of the former is the same as that of the latter, so far
as regards all the proceedings on the indictment." 4 A plea of nolo contendere
is an admission that the crime was committed within the district where the plea
was made, as the plea "is in effect a plea of guilty to every essential element of
the offense well pleaded in the charge against him, and warrants his conviction
without more ... though the conviction cannot be used in any other case."'"5
A plea of nolo contendere, like a plea of guilty, may be set aside if the indictment
charges no offense."' Likewise an appeal may be taken both where there is a
plea of guilty and a plea of nolo contendere. As in the case of a plea of guilty,
a jury trial is waived by making the plea, and it may be withdrawn only if the
court allows it.?37  As in the case of a plea of guilty, it should not be accepted
unless made voluntarily and intelligently,13' and like the plea of guilty, it permits
128 Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260, 262, (7th Cir. 1912); Twin Ports Oil Co. v.
Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 372 (D. Minn. 1939); Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451,
(1926). For good discussions of the plea see Lenvin and Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature
and Implications, 51 YALE L. J. 1255 (1942); Note, 21 NEB. L. REv. 40 (1942); 152 A.L.R.
253 (1944).
129 United States v. Weirton Steel Co., 62 F. Supp. 961, 962 (N.D.W.Va. 1945).
130 Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260, 267 (7th Cir. 1912); United States v. Glidden
Co., 78 F.2d 639, 642 (6th Cir. 1935). But see ANNOT. 152 A.L.R. 253 (1944).
131 Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 378 (D. Minn. 1939); Barnsdall
Refining Corp. v. Biramwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308, 312 (E.D. Wis. 1940). See ANNOT.
152 A.L.R. 253, 284 (1944).
132 United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 531, 532 (W.D. Wis. 1938). Ste
also, 152 A.L.R. 253, 270 (1944).
133 Gemignani v. United States, 9 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1925). See also Pharr v. United
States, 48 F.2d 767, 770 (6th Cir. 1931).
134 United States v. Hartwell, 26 Fed. Cas. 196, 201 (No. 15318) (O.C.D. Mass. 1869).
The crime was embezzlement of public funds, a felony.
135 United States v. Lair, 195 Fed. 47, 52 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 609 (1913).
Defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment, fined $2,500 and costs. The crime was
importing alien women for the purpose of prostitution, and was a felony.
136 Hacking Valley Ry. Co. v. United States, 210 Fed. 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1914). The
penalty fixed by the court was a fine of $42,000 for violation of the Interstate Commerce Act
and the Elkins Act. See also Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260, 262 (7th Cir. 1912).
Withdrawal of the plea was permitted when the indictment showed on its face that the statute
of limitations had run. United States v. Anthracite Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 1018 (M. D. Pa.
1934).
137 Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 97 F.2d 255, 256 (5th Cir. 1938), rehearing denied, 98 F.2d
541 (5th Cir. 1938).
138 Farnsworth v. Sanford, 33 F. Supp. 400, 402 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
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the defendant to plead double jeopardy if he is later prosecuted for the same
offense. 9
The record of the conviction of the principal on a plea of nolo contendere
is admissible on a trial of confederates, who are jointly indicted with him, and
tried on the theory that they are accessories, for the purpose of establishing the
conviction and prima facie the guilt of the principal. 4
The plea of nolo contendere differs from a plea of guilty in that it "cannot
be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit for the same
act."'"4 However under the federal statutes an alien may be deported who has
been sentenced to imprisonment for a year or more because of conviction in this
country of a crime involving moral turpitude. An alien so sentenced in a state
court following a plea of nolo contendere may be deported. 4 One may be
classified a second offender under the Fair Labor Standards Act if he has used
this plea-in a prior action. 43 This plea may not be used in a gasoline jobber's
civil action against an oil company which made the plea in an anti-trust case.'"
After a plea of nolo contendere nothing remains for the court but to render
judgment, as no issue of fact exists and none can be made while the plea remains
of record.'4 5 After entry of the plea, a stipulation of facts filed by the defendant
is ineffective to raise an issue as to the sufficiency of the indictment, or an issue
of fact upon the question of guilt or innocence. It could be used by the trial
court merely as evidence in determining what sentence was imposed. The stipu-
lation could not add particulars to the indictment as this calls for concurrence
by the grand jury. It could not raise an issue as to guilt or innocence as the plea,
like a plea of guilty, is conclusive on that. The defendant can obtain relief as
to such issues only by withdrawing his plea with leave of the court. In some
cases, where it was decided to submit a case to the court without a jury, the
defendant has pleaded nolo contendere and the court has then heard evidence
offered for the government and the defendant and then announced a finding
of guilty. 46 Such evidence cannot be used to attack the indictment or in-
formation or to raise an issue of guilt or innocence. Evidence is heard only to
aid the judge in fixing sentence. 4
139 United States v. Glidden Co., 78 F.2d 639, 641 (6th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
652; United States v. United States Industrial Alcohol Co., 15 F. Supp. 784, 787 (D. Md.
1936); see also Stewart v. United States, 300 Fed. 769, 776-777 (8th Cir. 1924).
140 United States v. Hartwell, 26 Fed. Cas. 196, (No. 15318) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869). But
see Pharr v. United States, 48 F.2d 767, 771 (6th Cir. 1931).
141 Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260, 262 (7th Cir. 1912). This view was adopted
by the Supreme Court in dicta in Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926); United
States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622 (1930). See also Berlin v. United States, 14 F.2d 497,
498 (3rd Cir. 1926); Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308, 312
(E. D. Wis. 1940); Caminetti v. Imperial Mut. Life Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 476, 139 P.2d
681, 689 (1943); 50 YALE L.J. 489, 505 (1941).
142 United States ex rel Bruno v. Reimer, 98 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1938).
143 United States v. Dasher, 51 F. Supp. 805, (E. D. Pa. 1943).
144 Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 371 (D. Minn. 1939); See also
Alden-Rochelle v. American Society, 3 F.R.D. 157, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
145 United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 623 (1930), reversing 34 F.2d 839 (3d Cir.
1929) which had reversed 29 F.2d 744, 745 (E.D. Pa. 1928). Accord, Dillon v. United States,
113 F.2d 334, 339 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 689 (1940); Fisher v. Schilder,
131 F.2d 522, 524 (10th Cir. 1942).
146 Roitman v. United States, 41 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1930).
147 Dillon v. United States, 113 F.2d 334, 338 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
689 (1940).
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated that the plea of
nolo contendere does not authorize a sentence of imprisonment. It cannot be
accepted in cases of felony requiring infamous punishment or in cases of mis-
demeanor for which the punishment must be imprisonment for any time witch
or without fine. 4 ' The court admitted that there were no English or American
cases expressly so limiting the plea. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a plea of nolo contendere is not applicable where the punishment must
be imprisonment with or without a fine, thus it would not be acceptable in a
capital case; but is applicable and may be accepted where punishment may be
by fine also, although an alternative imprisonment punishment is provided. 4
The case appealed involved the latter situation, hence the plea was held to lie
dlthough imprisonment had been imposed. The Supreme Court in affirming
the decision adopted wholly different reasoning. 50 A federal court could impose
a sentence of imprisonment in any case where an offense is punishable by im-
prisonment or fine or both. 5'
The plea was known to the common law, but there are no English decisions
involving its use after 1702. The common law did not clearly prevent a penalty
of imprisonment. A court in its discretion may mitigate the punishment, but it
is not mandatory that it do so.
Where the defendant pleads nolo contendere but the judgment recites that
the conviction was on a plea of guilty, there is no such fundamental error as goes
to the jurisdiction of the court.'52 Relief must be through appeal rather than
habeas corpus. After expiration of the term, the trial court probably could not
correct such an error by a nunc pro tunc order.
K. The Right to Counsel
In an 1818 criminal proceeding the defendant had counsel who advised him
to withdraw his plea of not guilty and stand mute. In argument counsel asserted
that in the United States a defendant has the "right to be heard and advised by
counsel in every stage of the proceedings against him." 5  In an 1834 capital
case involving robbery on the high seas the court appointed counsel two days
before the arraignment and plea of not guilty. 4 But it was not until 1938
that the Supreme Court took the view that a failure to comply with the pro-
vision in the sixth amendment guaranteeing the right to counsel meant that the
district court lost jurisdiction over the case.'55 Habeas corpus therefore lies.
148 Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260, 266-67 (7th Cir. 1912).
149 Hudson v. United States, 9 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1925). The penalty in the sentence
was imprisonment for a year and a day. The crimes were conspiracy to use and using the
mails to defraud.
150 Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926); 36 YALE L.J. 421 (1921). The case
was followed in Dillon v. United States, 113 F.2d 334, 338 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
689 (1940); Farnsworth v. Sanford, 33 F. Supp. 400 (N. D. Ga. 1940).
151 As to offenses for which they have been accepted see Annot. 152 A.L.R. 265-66 (1944).
152 Fisher v. Shilder, 131 F.2d 522, 524 (10th Cir. 1942).
153 United States v. Hare, 26 Fed. Cas. 148, 153 (No. 15304) (C.C.D. Md. 1818). See
also United States v. Bollman, 24 Fed. Cas. 1189, 1191 n. 2 (No. 14622) (C.C.D.C. 1807).
154 United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Gas. 1287, 1303 (No. 15204) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
155 Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); 24 CORNELL L. Q. 270 (1939); 24 IowA L.
REv. 170 (1938). See also BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 36-44
(1955).
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A single case has said that the right to counsel accrues when the grand jury
returns an indictment into court.' A single case has said that there is a right
to assign counsel even at the preliminary examination.' But the great weight
of authority is contrary.'58
A court of appeals has pointed out that the period from arraignment to
trial is the "most critical of the proceedings" as "investigation and preparation"
are vitally important, and the defendant should have counsel during that
period. 5 ' But the Supreme Court has stated in a state court case that, "like
other judgments, a judgment based on a plea of guilty is not of course to be
lightly impeached in collateral proceedings." 6 o
At his arraignment the district court should advise the defendant of his
right to counsel, and of his right, if indigent, to have counsel appointed for
him. 6' This is true even if the defendant pleads guilty.'62  "The constitutional
guarantees make no distinction between the arraignment and other stages of
criminal proceedings in respect of the application of the guarantee." '6 3 The
"right to assistance of counsel exists at the time of arraignment as well as at
the trial." 164 On the whole the federal cases have been in conflict as to whether
the defendant was deprived of his constitutional rights if he was unadvised at
the time of arraignment.6 5
Although a defendant is without counsel at arraignment and pleads not
guilty, habeas corpus does not lie when he was represented by an attorney at
the trial. 6 Likewise habeas corpus does not lie where the defendant without
counsel pleaded not guilty and the jury was selected and impaneled, and the
court upon being advised that the defendant had engaged counsel, delayed
proceedings until counsel arrived and accepted the jury."
7
Even when the defendant pleads guilty but the court appoints counsel
156 Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir,), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 631
(1942).
157 Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
158 Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U.
PITr. L. REv. 489, 527-28 (1958). See also MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 177-
79 (1959).
159 Price v. Johnston, 144 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1944).
160 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 474 (1945). The court cited in support a case in-
volving a federal criminal defendant. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938).
161 United States ex rel Nortner v. Hiatt, 33 F. Supp. 545 (M.D. Pa. 1940) ; Evans v. Rives,
126 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Michener v. Johnston, 141 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir.
1944). Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment. '20 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1,
10, 14 (1944). This practice had been followed as early as 1834. United States v. Gibert, 25
Fed. Cas. 1287, 1303 (No. 15204) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
162 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Michener v. Johnston, 141 F.2d 171, 174, 175 (9th Cir. 1944); Holtzoff, The
Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 11-13 (1944). See also
United States v. Brest, 266 F.2d 879 (3rd Cir. 1959).
163 Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
164 Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F. Supp. 774, 778 (N. D. Cal. 1943) (habeas corpus granted).
Accord, Michener v. Johnston, 141 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1944).
165 Note, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 271, 276 (1942).
166 De Maurez v. Swope, 104 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1939). In Alexander v. United
States, 136 F.2d 783, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1943) it was held that there would be no reversal on
an appeal. See also Dorsey v. Gill, 148-F.2d 857, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 890 (1945); Wilfong v. Johnston, 156 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1946).
167 Thompson v. King, 107 F.2d 307, 308 (8th Cir. 1939).
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immediately after arraignment, and the defendant elects on advice of counsel
to stand on his plea of guilty which was subject to change, the constitutional
rights of the defendant are not violated.' Habeas corpus would not lie,
although better practice required appointment at arraignment. The Supreme
Court laid down a similar rule in a state court case.'69 Professor Fellman has
concluded: "It has been held that an accused is entitled to the assistance of a
lawyer upon arraignment whether he pleads guilty or not, but the weight of
opinion seems to be otherwise." "'
While a plea of guilty may be made without advice of counsel'.' the court
before accepting it should determine whether it was made with intelligence and
comprehension." 2
The defendant- may waive the right to counsel and such waiver may be
informal.' 3 Waiver will ordinarily be implied when the accused appears with-
out counsel and fails to request that counsel be assigned to him." According to
three cases the constifutional right to counsel did not apply to a voluntary and
intelligent guilty plea. 5 No waiver of counsel was found where the defendant
pleading guiltywas eighteen years old and ignorant of the charge, and the
record failed to indicate advice as to the right to counsel.7 6 Nor was there a
waiver, where the court failed to advise as to the consequences of a plea of
guilty, and where the court conducted a private meeting in chambers with the
government attorney and a probation officer.' 7
In determining whether there was an implied waiver the appellate courts
examine the whole factual picture. If the defendant had been in court pre-
viously, this tends to show a waiver by his failure to request appointment.78 The
same is true where the defendant discussed his case with a lawyer whom he
failed to retain. 9 Waiver was found where the defendant had shown a shrewd
knowledge by bargaining with the United States Attorney.' If factual data
were not available an appellate court would emphasize the usual presumption
- 168 McJordan v. Huff, 133 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. "Cir. 1943). See also Saylor v. Sanford,
99 F.2d 605, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 630 (1939); Bugg v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d
260 (10th Cir. 1940); Beckett v. Hudspeth, 131 F.2d 195 (10th Cir. 1942).
169 Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 85 (1946). This case was followed as to a federal
criminal defendant in Hiatt v. Gann, 170 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1948).
170 Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REV. 559,
588 (1948). Up to 1938 it "was common practice not to assign counsel for a defendant de-
siring to plead guilty." Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment. 20 N.Y.U.
L. Rnv. 1, 8 (1944). See also BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 32
(1955).
171 Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277 (1942); Cooke v. Swope,
28 F. Supp. 492, 494 (W.D.Wash. 1939).
172 Bergen v. United States, 145 F.2d 181, 187 (8th Cir. 1944) (defendant allowed to
withdraw his plea.).
173 42 COLUM. L. REV. 271, 279 (1942); BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN
COURTS 64-72 (1955).
174 See cases cited in Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 639 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
175 Cook v. Swope, 109 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1940); Adkins v. Sanford, 120 F.2d 471 (5th
Cir. 1941); Parker v. Johnston, 29 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
176 United States v. Hiatt, 33 F. Supp. 545 (M.D. Pa. 1940).
177 Zeff v. Sanford, 31 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
178 Buckner v. Hudspeth, 105 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1939); Cundiff v. Nicholson, 107 F.2d
162 (4th Cir. 1939) ; United States ex rel Coate v. Hill, 29 F. Supp. 890, 891 (M.D. Pa. 1939).
179 Parker v. Johnston, 29 F. Supp. 829, 831 (N.D. Cal. 1939) ; Ex parte Rose, 33 F. Supp.
941, 943 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
180 Logan v. Johnston, 28 F. Supp. 98, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
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in habeas corpus proceedings that the judgment below was regular and the
waiver was presumptively competent. This might overcome the defendant's
contention that he had been insane,"8 ' or that he was ignorant and lacked
friends.'82 Evidence of a court custom of advising all defendants of their right
to counsel was held sufficient to overcome the silent record.'
In 1941 the Supreme Court tightened the rules as to waiver of counsel.
Where a defendant, regardless of whether or not he intended to plead guilty, had
not been advised of his right to have counsel or had not waived the right in
knowing fashion, the judgment was held invalid.8
4 A silent record, a lack of
request for counsel, and a plea of guilty would no longer show a waiver. Follow-
ing this holding the flood of applications for habeas corpus increased.
8 5 An
unadvised negro defendant with a fourth grade education was presumably
ignorant of his right to counsel, so that his failure to request counsel and his
plea of guilty did not constitute a waiver."8 ' But there was no need to advise
a defendant who had several previous convictions and who had corresponded
with an attorney."' Where there had been previous convictions, and where
there was some evidence of an offer of counsel though nothing appeared on
the record, a waiver was found. 8 There is no waiver where a lawyer repre-
senting a co-defendant asked the defendant if he wanted counsel; the court
relied in part on the inexperience of the defendant. 8 9 Where a young defendant
had only the advice of an intoxicated father and a hysterical mother and there
was a record of insanity in the defendant's history no waiver was found. 90 Where
the United States Attorney undertakes the duty to inform the accused he must
inform correctly, as a defendant can waive only with correct knowledge.' 9 ' It
is not correct to inform the defendant that he has the right to counsel "in the
event he is not guilty and wants to stand trial." If the defendant's knowledge
of his right to have counsel can be shown from other facts in the case, the failure
of the record to show advice and an offer of counsel by the judge is not fatal
error and does not warrant relief on a writ of error coram nobis. 92 It is better
practice to have the waiver in writing. .Waiver by a defendant seventeen years
old was found when everyone concerned with the case testified that he had been
181 Collins v. Johnston, 29 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
182 Blood v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 470, 471 (10th Cir. 1940).
183 Towne v. Hudspeth, 108 F.2d 676, 677 (10th Cir. 1939); Warden v. Johnston, 29 F.
Supp. 207, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1939); United States ex rel Coate v. Hill, 29 F. Supp. 890, 891
(M.D. Pa. 1939); Harpin v. Johnston, 109 F. 2d 434, 435 (9th Cir. 1940).
184 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941); BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN
AmERICAN COURTS 66-69 (1955).
185 See generally, BEANFY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 69-72 (1955).
186 Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
187 O'Keith v. Johnston, 129 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 680 (1942).
188 Widmer v. Johnston, 136 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1943); Pinfold v. Hunter, 140 F.2d
564, 565 (10th Cir. 1944).
189 Bayless v. Johnston, 48 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
190 Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F. Supp. 774, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
191 Michener v. Johnston, 141 F.2d 171, 174, 175 (9th Cir. 1944).
192 United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 441 (3rd. Cir. 1944). 'Circuit Judge Biggs dis-
sented in part. He thought the writ of error coram nobis particularly appropriate to raise the
issue of the right to counsel, 144 F.2d 447. See also De Jordan v. Hunter, 145 F.2d 287
(10th Cir. 1944).
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told by several officials of the right to counsel.' 93 On the other hand even though
the waiver appears in the record it may be held incompetent; the fact that the
defendant was only seventeen upset the presumption of an intelligent waiver.194
Insanity makes a waiver invalid.'95
Bad advice of a court-appointed counsel as to a plea of guilty is not necessari-
ly ground for habeas corpus. To justify habeas corpus an extreme case must be
disclosed, and it must be shown that the proceedings were a farce and a mockery
of justice. Serious mistakes on the part of an attorney are not alone enough.
Incompetency was not shown by the fact that counsel advised the defendant to
plead guilty to the lesser charge of grand larceny, rather than go to trial for
robbery, because otherwise he would likely be found guilty on his previous record
and be given a heavier penalty. 9 '
III. RULE 11 AS INTERPRETED IN THE DECISIONS
A. Time of Pleas
Normally the defendant's plea will be made after a motion to dismiss. Federal
Criminal Rule 12(b) (3) provides: "The motion shall be made before the plea
is entered but the court may permit it to be made within a reasonable time
thereafter." One case erroneously referred to a statute requiring objection to be
made before or within ten days of arraignment.97  This statute is now super-
seded by Rule 12(b) (3). In one case the court permitted the motion to dismiss
to be made after a plea of not guilty. 9 A plea of guilty may be entered after
impaneling of the jury, upon withdrawal of a plea of not guilty.'99
B. Presence of Court Reporter
Under an act of Congress of 1944 a court reporter is to attend at each
session and to record among other matters "all proceedings in criminal cases had
in open court, whether connected with pleas, trial or sentence." 200 A motion to
vacate sentence for absence of a reporter would not lie as to criminal proceedings
before this statute. 0 ' It is not a basis for reversal on appeal that arraignment
and a plea of not guilty do not appear in the stenographer's notes of the trial.22
It is enough that the district judge has found that the defendant pleaded not
193 United States v. Dunbar, 55 F. Supp. 678, 680 (E.D.N.Y, 1944).
194 William v. Huff, 146 F.2d 867, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The court thought a trial
court should always examine a minor to test his intelligence in connection with a waiver of
counsel. This case was cited favorably in Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 165 (1957).
195 Kuczynski v. United States, 149 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1945).
196 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
In Beckett v. Hudspeth, 131 F.2d 195, 196 (10th Cir. 1942) court appointed counsel was
found competent. The attorney was 38 years old, a law school graduate, had practiced 13
years and was a member of a large Indianapolis firm. He had had three conferences with the
defendant before the plea was filed, and had fully advised the defendant of his rights and the
consequences of the plea.
197 Wright v. United States, 165 F.2d 405, 407 (8th Cir. 1948).
198 United States v. Dixon, 73 F. Supp. 683, 684 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
199 United States v. Shepherd, 108 F. Supp. 721 (D.N.H. 1952).
200 Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 17
(1944).
201 United States v. Christakos, 83 F. Supp. 521, 523 (N.D. Ala. 1949); United States v.
Shepherd, 108 F. Supp. 721, 723 (D.N.H. 1952).
202 Beaty v. United States, 203 F.2d 652, 653 (4th Cir. 1953).
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guilty, and that such plea was entered by the clerk on his original record, and was
referred to by the judge in his charge to the jury. The court reporter must, as
a minimum, without charge and as a routine matter transcribe and certify in
every criminal case the proceedings on the defendant's pleas."'
C. Waiver of Plea
It is well settled that arraignment and a plea of not guilty are waived by
going to trial.2  Waiver of formal arraignment will not make a plea of guilty
invalid."' There are no cases of a waiver of a guilty plea. In one case in which
the defendant asserted that there had been no entry of a guilty plea, the court
accepted the written record of entry of such a plea as against the unsupported
allegations of the accused.0 ' In the opinion of the author where there is a
conviction and sentence without trial there must have been either a plea of guilty
or of nolo contendere.
D. Plea of Not Guilty
Arraignment and a plea of not guilty may be before one judge and trial
before another.20 7  Such procedure is neither unlawful nor unusual and is
authorized by statute.0 s There is no denial of due process because arraignment,
plea of not guilty, and impaneling of the jury take place on the same day. 0 '
The defendant could protect himself by moving for a continuance when the case
was called for trial.
On a plea of not guilty the defendant may raise the issue of insanity at the
time of the crime.210  Likewise he may raise the issue of entrapment.
211
A defendant may, with leave of the court, withdraw his plea of not guilty
and plead nolo contendere.2  Such withdrawal may be shown by the defend-
ant's conduct. A defendant may also withdraw his plea of not guilty and plead
guilty to a lesser degree of the crime."'
E. Plea of Guilty
In 1959 Judge Alexander Holtzoff stated: "In all courts, both Federal and
State, a great majority of criminal cases are disposed of on pleas of guilty.321 4
In 1953, eighty-three percent of federal criminal convictions resulted from guilty
pleas. 
21 5
203 Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
204 Beaty v. United States, 203 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1953) (facts showed arraignment
and plea).
205 Merritt v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 739, 741 (10th Cir. 1948).
206 Scott v. Johnston, 71 F. Supp. 117, 119 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
207 Palmer v. United States, 249 F.2d 8, 9 (10th Cir. 1957).
208 28 U.S.C. §137 (1952).
209 Picciurro v. United States, 250 F.2d 585, 590 (8th Cir. 1958).
210 Bradley v. United States, 249 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
211 Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1956); 70 HtAv. L. REv.
1302 (1957). See also 44 IowA L. REv. 578, 579-580 (1959).
212 Chapman v. United States, 247 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1957).
213 Irby v. United States, 246 F.2d 706, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1957). But before the court will
accept the substituted guilty plea it should determine that it is voluntary and intelligent. United
States v. Mack, 249 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1957).
214 United States v. Von der Heide, 169 F. Supp. 560, 565 (D.D.C. 1959). See also
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL 297-99 (1947).
215 Note, 64 YALE L.J. 590 (1955).
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A plea of guilty may be accepted in a division of the district other than that
in which the crime was committed without the express consent of the defendant
even though this may be irregular under Rules 18 and 19."18 The defect is not
one of jurisdiction and may be waived. In general venue is waivable and objec-
tion to improper venue should be made to the trial court when pleading. 1
A defendant may make a valid plea of guilty even though he is an epileptic
and even though he had an epileptic seizure on the day he pleaded.1 In one
case in which a defendant alleged that he was of unsound mind because of drug
addiction when he waived counsel and pleaded guilty, both the district court and
the court of appe.als agreed that the evidence did not show unsound mind." 9
Where a federal district judge has concluded that a defendant may be competent
to stand trial, it does not follow that the court should accept a plea of guilty as a
greater degree of awareness is required for such a plea 2  If- an issue as to a
defendant's sanity or mental competence is raised before trial, the court should
have the defendant examined by a psychiatrist, and upon a report indicating pres-
ent insanity, the court must hold a hearing and make a finding with respect
thereto.2" ' The Supreme Court has held that the statute is constitutional and
that it is not confined to cases of temporary mental disorder. 2 The writ of
error coram nobis has been granted to test the mental competency of the defend-
ant in making his plea.2 A motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. section 2255
also lies. 24
Traditionally the defendant is called upon to plead by having the inter-
rogatory propounded to him, after reading of the indictment, "How do you
plead: guilty or not guilty?" The defendant then answers "guilty" or "not
guilty", or stands mute. But due process is not violated by a less formal mode
of pleading. In one situation a court called an F.B.I. agent for his report
conceming investigations of the defendant, and the agent stated specifically what
the defendant was charged with. When the agent finished, counsel for defendant
stated that he had talked with the defendant, and that he wished to plead guilty.
A motion to vacate was held not to lie because the defendant's attorney, ap-
pointed by the court on the day of arraignment, stated, while standing beside
the defendant before the judge, that defendant wished to plead guilty, and the
defendant answered affinmatively the court's question as to whether the charges
heard by the defendant were correct.225 The defendant had then effectively
pleaded guilty in person, as well as by attorney.
216 United States v. Bistram, 153 F. Supp. 816, 818 (D.N.D.), af'd, 253 F.2d 610, 613
(8th Cir. 1958). See Orfield, Venue of Federal Criminal Cases, 17 U. PITT. L. REv. 375, 407-
15 (1956).
217 Walker v. United States, 218 F.2d 80, 81 (7th Cir. 1955).
218 Gann v. Gough, 79 F. Supp. 912, 914 (N.D. Ga.) rev'd on other grounds, sub nom.
Hiatt v. Gann, 170 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 920 (1949).
219 Lipscomb v. United States, 209 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1954).
220 In re Williams, 165 F. Supp. 879, 881 (D.D.. 1958).
221 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
222 Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366 (1956) ; 7 HASTINGS L. J. 202 (1956) ; 41
IOWA L. REv. 303 (1956); 55 MicH. L. REv. 127 (1956).
223 Roberts v. United States, 158 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1946); Allen v. United States, 162
F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1947).
224 Seidner v. United States, 260 F.2d 732, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
225 Mayes v. United States, 117 F.2d 505, 506 (8th Cir. 1949). Historically the defendant
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When the defendant is in court with his counsel, the plea of guilty may be
made by his counsel even in a felony case." 6 The defendant need not plead out
of his own mouth. There is no loss of jurisdiction because the plea is made by
the attorney, and there may be a waiver of arraignment and plea. One court has
pointed out that while at common law a defendant in a felony case must plead
in person, today an exception exists when the defendant is present and indicates
his approval or acquiescence in the plea.22 It will be noted that these cases do
not say that the plea may be made in the defendant's absence. Federal Criminal
Rule 43 provides that the defendant "shall be present at the arraignment." But
it also provides: "In prosecutions for offenses punishable by fine or by imprison-
ment for not more than one year or both, the court, with the written consent of
the defendant, may permit arraignment, plea, trial and imposition of sentence
in the defendant's absence." Since the rule uses the word "may" the court has
discretion to permit or to deny absence.
Stipulations by defendant's counsel may in effect amount to a plea of guilty.
It was so held where counsel made stipulations and statements admitting crucial
facts and that the defendant had no defense to offer, that the defendant's counsel
and the government counsel agreed that the government had established a prima
facie case, and that defendant's counsel did not wish to put the defendant on
the stand.2
A defendant may plead guilty even to first degree murder.122  The power
of the court to accept pleas of guilty for offenses cognizable within its jurisdiction
is inherent in its very existence. It is necessary to serve the practical ends of
justice. A plea in a capital case should be with the advice of counsel. In such
a case the court may impose any sentence the jury should impose. It is not con-
fined to imposing a death sentence, and a jury is not necessary to the imposition
of life imprisonment. A court has pointed out: "Rule 11 provides that the
arraigning judge may in his discretion refuse to accept a plea of guilty. We do
not decide whether a judge should refuse a plea of guilty when made by one who
asserts his innocence but enters the plea with full understanding of the nature
of the charge and the consequences of his action."2' 0  A court may, over the
defendant's objection, refuse to accept a plea of guilty on the ground of mental
incompetency even though he was sufficiently competent for trial.21  A court
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty from a defendant without counsel until he
confers with counsel subsequently appointed by the court." 2
was allowed to plead in person in England because he was not allowed counsel in treason cases
until 1695 and in felonies until 1836. Berg, Criminal Procedure: France, England, and the
United States, 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 256, 271 (1959).
226 Merritt v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1948). The assistant United States Attor-
ney had explained the charge on inquiry by the court. The defendant admitted that he under-
stood the charge. See Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1300 (1937). See also Brown v. United States, 182
F. 2d 933, 934 (8th Cir. 1950) (motion to vacate denied) ; United States v. Port Washington
Brewing Co., 277 Fed. 306, 308 (E. D. Wis. 1921) (writ of error coram nobis denied).
227 Julian v. United States, 236 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1956); 47 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S.
(1957). Here the plea was not accepted.
228 Julian v. United States, 236 F.2d 155, 157 (6th Cir. 1956).
229 Donnelly v. United States, 185 F.2d 559, 560 (10th Cir. 1950).
230 United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 499 n.4 (2d Cir. 1957). See also PUTTKAMMER,
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 170 n. 17 (1953).
231 In re Williams, 165 F. Supp. 879, 881 (D.D.C. 1959).
232 United States v. Von der Heide, 169 F. Supp. 560, 565 (D.D.C. 1959).
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A plea of guilty should not be accepted unless made voluntarily, after proper
advice, and with full understanding of the consequences."' The Supreme Court
has quoted a text writer as saying:
Since a plea of guilty is a confession in open court and a waiver
of trial, it has always been received with great caution. It is the
duty of the court to see that. the defendant thoroughly understands
the situation and acts voluntarily before receiving it.23 4
One court has concluded that the standard for acceptance of a plea of
guilty under Rule 11 and the standard for determination whether a guilty plea
may be withdrawn are the same; or, more precisely, that the standard under
Rule 32(d) is not less favorable to the defendant than the standard under Rule
11. 35
In the last decade there has been a series of cases spelling out the duty of
the trial court to determine whether or not the guilty plea is voluntary and
intelligent. The Eighth Circuit has held that the explanation could be made to
the defendant by the Assistant United States Attorney instead of by the trial
judge.
238
A defendant without counsel at arraignment and plea is constitutionally
entitled to considerable explanation and discussion of the charge against him and
the facts affecting a decision to plead guilty.237 This is also true where at the
trial a lawyer employed by a co-defendant volunteered to defend him and advised
him to plead guilty, since the defendant is entitled to counsel without conflicting
interest. The trial court need not explain and set out for the accused the
possible defenses he might adduce to the charges against him, even if counsel
is waived, and the court finds a competent, intelligent, and intentional waiver.38
According to anoiher court of appeals a defendant is not in a position to
assert that his plea of guilty was accepted without the court first determining
that the plea was made voluntarily and intelligently where he is represented by
an attorney of his own choosing and the attorney makes a statement to the
court in the defendant's presence indicating that the defendant had acted
deliberately after a week's consideration in deciding to plead guilty."' The
defendant is bound by the statements of his attorney made in his presence and
with his apparent acquiescence and understanding. Another court has also
stated broadly that the court need make no inquiry as to whether the plea was
233 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 719 (1948). This was followed in Gann v. Gough,
79 F. Supp. 912, 915 (N.D. Ga. 1948). See also United States v. Shapiro, 222 F.2d 836, 840
(7th Cir. 1955).
234 ORFrELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Fiom ARREST To APPEAL 300 (1947), cited in 332
U.S. 708, 719 n.5.
235 United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1957). See the excellent discus-
sions of Rule 32(d) in 55 COLUM. L. Rv. 366; 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 730; 64 YALE L.J. 590.
236 Michener v. United States, 181 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1950). As to state law on the
duty of the court to admonish the defendant of the consequences of his plea see Annot., 110
A.L.R. 228 (1937).
237 Howard v. United States, 186 F.2d 778, 780 (6th Cir. 1951). On a motion to vacate
the defendant is entitled to a hearing. See also Van Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708, 721-23
(1947); Ruebush v. United States, 206 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1953); Collins v. United States,
176 F.2d 773 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 943 (1950); Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d
580 (10th Cir. 1949).
238 Michener v. United States, 181 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir 1950).
239 Taylor v. United States, 182 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 988
(1950).
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voluntary and intelligent when the defendant is represented by counsel.24 But
the Seventh Circuit took a different view. The duty under Rule 11 to determine
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge
is mandatory. The trial court "is not relieved of the duty which it imposes solely
because the accused . . . is represented by counsel of his choice." 24 A failure
to make the determination is reversible error only in the absence of a showing
that in fact the defendant understood the nature of the charge. Such knowledge
will not be presumed from the fact of representation by counsel where the defend-
ant alleges that he was misled by false statements of his counsel. No particular
ritual need be followed in the determination, but a brief discussion with the
defendant regarding the nature of the charges may normally be the simplest
and most direct way of ascertaining the state of his knowledge. In a subsequent
decision the court of appeals of the same circuit made it clear that there may
be cases where the defendant has requisite understanding so that the court need
not instruct the defendant as to the charges." 2 The explanation need not be
made by the trial judge personally. It is sufficient that the defendant has the
requisite understanding from another. The explanation of the charges and
possible penalties made by the defendant's attorney may be enough. Sub-
sequently the same court of appeals held that where a husband and wife had
been charged with a narcotics violation, and counsel simply announced to the
trial court on the wife's behalf that he was withdrawing her plea of not guilty
to three counts of a twelve count indictment and asked that a guilty plea be
substituted and that he had acquainted her with the consequences of the plea,
the trial court did not comply with Rule 1 l." ' The minimum requirements of
Rule 11 are that the trial court determine if the guilty plea was her desire, if the
plea was voluntary, and if she understood the nature of the charges to which
she was pleading guilty.
The Tenth Circuit has concluded that the trial court should advise the
defendant concerning the nature of the charge, the range of possible punishment,
possible defenses, possible circumstances in mitigation, and other similar factors
entering into the equation, as well as of the right to the assistance of counsel.244
While it may be better practice for the court to inquire, even when the defendant
appears with counsel of his own selection, if the defendant has been apprised
of his constitutional rights including the right to trial by jury, a failure to so
inquire is not reversible error and a motion to vacate judgment and sentence
does not lie.245 Doubtless the trend is for the courts to be more careful about
240 United States v. Shepherd, 108 F. Supp. 721, 723 (D.N.H. 1952). See also United States
v. Sturm, 180 F.2d 413, 416 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 986 (1950).
241 United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1954). The decision was two to
one. The majority of the court held that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion
to vacate. This case was cited in Bridges v. United States, 259 F.2d 611, 625 (9th Cir. 1958)
(dissenting opinion).
242 United States v. Swaggerty, 218 F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 359
(1955).
243 United States v. Mack, 249 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1957). The court of appeals or-
dered a hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty.
244 Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d 580, 582 (10th Cir. 1949).
245 Barber v. United States, 227 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1955). See also Bradley v.
United States, 262 F.2d 679, 680 (10th Cir. 1959).
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discussion, explanation, and interrogation.2" The Sixth Circuit has insisted on
interrogation and discussion where defendant's counsel, by stipulation as to
crucial facts, in effect entered a plea of guilty." 7 The Fifth Circuit has held that
a failure to make the determination of voluntary and intelligent pleading cast
the burden on the government in a coram nobis proceeding to show that the plea
was voluntarily and intelligently made.24 Furthermore if the plea was made on
any understanding or agreement as to punishment to be recommended the trial
court must, before accepting the plea, make certain that it was voluntarily made.
But on rehearing before the court of appeals sitting en banc, the court, with two
judges dissenting, affirmed the decision of the trial court against the defendant.
2 49
Rule 11 does not require that a certain form of finding must be entered in the
record. The court of appeals agreed that the evidence sustained a finding that
the plea was voluntarily made notwithstanding evidence that as a result of the
plea the defendant expected to receive favorable treatment. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and on consideration of the record and confession of error
by the Solicitor General that the plea might have been improperly obtained,
judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case remanded to the
district court for further proceedings."'
The Second Circuit held that there must be something more than a
perfunctory examination conducted by the prosecutor. The judge should
thoroughly investigate the circumstances under which the plea is made; and
when the defendant is without counsel, an even more exacting inquiry is de-
manded. Before accepting the plea the court should determine whether the plea
has been improperly induced by the prosecutor and whether the defendant is
aware of the nature of the charges, statutory offenses included therein, range of
possible punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circum-
stances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad under-
standing of the whole matter. And such a determination may be made only by
a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all circumstances under which
the plea is made. But the inadequacy of the determination is not reversible error
in the absence of a showing that the defendant had been misled by the govern-
ment.251
The Fourth Circuit does not approve "anything less than full compliance
with Rules 10 and 11." 252 The rules serve to protect not only important rights
246 In United States v. Espinosa, 16 F.R.D. 420, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) the court in deny-
ing withdrawal of a guilty plea pointed out that the court had interrogated the defendant. See
also Hardy v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 208, 210-211 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Johnston v. United
States, 254 F.2d 239, 241 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Nelson, 172 F. Supp. 86, 92
(W. D. Ark. 1959).
247 Julian v. United States, 236 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1956).
248 Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 112 (5th Cir. 1957). Circuit Judge Tuttle dis-
sented.
249 Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957). This case was followed in
Kennedy v. United States, 249 F.2d 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1957); Kennedy v. United States, 259
F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1958); Cf. Floyd v. United States, 260 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1958).
250 Shelton v. United States, 356 U. S. 26 (1958). For another instance of confession of
error see Dandridge v. United States, 356 U. S. 259 (1958).
251 United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 499 (2d. Cir. 1957). The case was remanded
so that the defendant could re-argue his motion to withdraw his plea. Circuit Judge Lumbard
dissented.
252 Gundlach v. United States, 262 F.2d 72, 76 (4th Cir. 1958).
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of defendants, but also protect proper administration of the criminal law. Full
compliance with the rules and having the record show this discourages motions
to vacate. Even the presence of counsel does not relieve the judge of his obliga-
tion under the rules, although this is a circumstance to be taken into account
in determining the nature and extent of the inquiry to be made. While no
particular ritual is required, an alert and adequate inquiry should be made.
A district judge of the District of Columbia has said that a violation of the
rule for determination that the plea is intelligent and voluntary is a violation of
a mere rule of practice and does not necessarily result in a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights, and therefore no motion to vacate should lie.25 But on the
facts he found that such a determination had been made in the case. The rule
does not require the court personally to question the defendant. The court may
rely on representations of counsel. Subsequently the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals pointed out that there would be fewer motions to vacate if the court
made an inquiry "sufficient to bring to light any facts which might affect the
validity of the plea." " It has also been pointed out that the most obvious way
to assure that the defendant has knowledge of what he is doing is to require
the judge to inform the defendant at least of the direct consequences of his plea
and of the court's absolute discretion over the sentence within the stated statutory
limits.' 5 In general the trial judge should clearly and simply advise the defend-
ant of the nature of the accusation, of the consequences of the plea, and of his
right to counsel.25 6 He should refrain from making an assurance or promise and
should warn the defendant that any assurance or promise made by another
including the prosecutor cannot bind the court. He should not accept the plea
without a determination that it is voluntarily made.
The court of appeals of the District of Columbia has held that the words
"with understanding" refer merely to the meaning of the charge, and what acts
amount to being guilty of the charge, and the consequences of pleading guilty
thereto, rather than to dilatory or evidentiary charges.257
Before accepting a plea of guilty the trial judge should not consult privately
with the prosecuting agent regarding information as to the social and economic
background of the defendant, including his prior criminal record.25 This is
especially true where the defendant has waived grand jury indictment and the
right to counsel.
A court of appeals has held that a sentence must be vacated on the ground
that the statements made by the trial court were reasonably calculated to in-
253 United States v. Von der Heide, 169 F. Supp. 560, 566 (D.D.C. 1959).
254 Smith v. United States, 265 F.2d 99, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
255 Note, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 379 (1955). Such a warning will usually preclude a
showing of reliance on assurances made to the defendant. Kramer v. United States, 166 F.2d
515, 517 (9th Cir. 1948); Friedman v. United States, 200 F.2d 690, 697 (8th Cir. 1952);
United States v. Booth, 112 F. Supp. 60, 65 (S.D. (Cal.), aff'd, 209 F.2d 183 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 923 (1954).
256 Note, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 366, 380 (1955).
257 Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1958). One judge dissented.
258 Smith v. United States, 238 F.2d 925, 931 (5th Cir.), reversing 137 F. Supp. 222
(M. D. Ala. 1956); United States v. Chnistakos. 83 F. Supp. 521, 525 (N.D. Ala. 1949).
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fluence the defendant to the point of coercion." 9 The court stated that if the
defendant stood trial and was found guilty, the court would expect to give him
the maximum sentence as he had put the government to the expense of a trial
when he was guilty. The Seventh Circuit recently held that a federal district
court has no authority under the Federal Probation Act to predicate denial of a
first offender's probation request upon a standing policy of refusing to consider
probation for defendants who plead not guilty.
2 6 0
An accused who has been convicted on a guilty plea induced by threats,
promises, and intimidations by law enforcement agents has been deprived of
constitutional rights to the same extent as a person who has been convicted upon
a confession obtained through coercion, and habeas corpus will lie.2 ' But the
obtaining of a confession during illegal detention in violation of Rule 5 does not
render a subsequent guilty plea involuntary and nugatory."'
When on appeal a defendant claims that he pleaded guilty to a lesser charge
because he was told by the Assistant United States Attorney that if he so pleaded
he would receive a sentence of from one year and one day to not more than two
years, but was sentenced to five years, there is no ground for reversal when the
Assistant United States Attorney offered three affidavits showing conclusively
that no such agreement was made and the record showed that the trial judge
explained every right to him.2"3 A motion to vacate will not lie where the
record does not show alleged coercion by the judge." 4 Nor does the motion to
vacate lie where the defendant was not prejudiced or misled by alleged mis-
representations made to him by an Assistant United States Attorney,265 or where
no misrepresentations were made.268 Motion to vacate does not lie where the
record disproves alleged coercion by F.B.I. agents. 287 A motion to vacate was
denied when the record failed to show that a narcotics agent persuaded the
defendant to retain a certain attorney and this resulted in inadequate legal
representation.288 It would not lie merely because the F.B.I. agent, United
States Marshal, and the United States Commissioner had advised him to plead
guilty.28
9
259 Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293, 294 (10th Cir. 1957). Withdrawal of a guilty
plea was permitted when the trial judge imposed a severe sentence after making a remark
which might have been interpreted as a promise of leniency. United States v. Lias, 173 F. 2d
685, 688 (4th Cir. 1949). See Note, 55 COLUM. L. Rnv. 366, 371 (1955).
260 United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1959). One judge dissented.
261 Behrens v. Hironimus, 166 F.2d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 1948). The district court was di-
rected to hear the evidence on such allegations. See also Teller v. United States, 263 F.2d 871,
872 (6th Cir. 1959) granting a hearing on a motion to vacate the sentence; United States v.
Morin, 265 F.2d 241, 245 (3rd Cir. 1959).
262 United States v. Morin, 265 F.2d 241, 246 (3rd Cir. 1959).
263 Hudson v. United States, 164 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1947). See also Davis v. United
States, 226 F.2d 834, 839 (8th Cir.), affirming, 123 F. Supp. 407. (D. Minn. 1954).
264 Williams v. United States, 177 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1949).
265 Michener v. United States, 181 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1950).
266 Stidham v. United States, 170 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1948); Young v. United States,
228 F.2d 693, 694 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 913 (1956); United States v. Hoyland,
264 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1959).
267 Hurst v. United States, 180 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir. 1950); Baldwin v. United States,
141 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
268 Johnston v. United States, 254 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1958).
269 Adam v. United States, 266 F.2d 819, 820 (10th Cir. 1959).
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A defendant who wishes to object that his plea of guilty was obtained by
the defendant's attorney misleading him as to a light sentence should do so by
appeal from the conviction and not by motion to vacate.2 70 The same is true
as to promises of the United States Attorney or F.B.I. agents. But in a case
involving trickery by the defendant's attorney the rule might be different if he
was not represented by other counsel not involved in the trickery.2 '
A plea of guilty is a waiver of trial by jury. 72 This is true even though the
charge is first degree murder and the sentence might be capital punishment.7
A plea of guilty admits all the facts charged in the indictment or information . 7 4
It is a formal criminal pleading which waives trial and defense and leaves the
court nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.27 It is not a mere ad-
mission of guilt or an extra-judicial confession of guilt, but is as conclusive as the
verdict of a jury.276 And the plea of guilty must be to the crime charged in the
indictment or information. A plea to some other crime would not be valid."7
A plea of guilty waives all defenses other than that the indictment or
information charges no offense.278 All defects not jurisdictional are waived. 9
Double jeopardy is waived.2"' The statute of limitations is waived.2"' The
sufficiency of the indictment or information is not subject to collateral attack
after a plea of guilty, either in a habeas corpus proceeding or by a motion to
270 Crowe v. United States, 175 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949); United States v. Bush,
135 F. Supp. 3, 4 (S.D.W. Va. 1955). On the limits of motion to vacate see United States v.
Edwards, 152 F. Supp. 179, 184 nn. 12 & 13 (D.D.C. 1957).
271 Crowe v. United States, 175 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949).
272 Donnelly v. United States, 185 F.2d 559, 560 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 949
(1951) ; Lipscomb v. United States, 226 F.2d 812, 815 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971
(1956) ; Bridges v. United States, 259 F.2d 611, 617 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847
(1958).
273 Donnelly v. United States, 185 F.2d 559, 561 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 949
(1951).
274 Hawley v. Hunter, 161 F.2d 825, 826 (10th Cir. 1947); Maye v. Pescor, 162 F.2d 641,
643 (8th Cir. 1947); Thornburg v. United States, 164 F.2d 37, 39 (10th Cir. 1947); Dalton
v. Hunter, 174 F.2d 633, 635 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 906 (1949); Godish v.
United States, 182 F.2d 342, 343 (10th Cir. 1950); Kahl v. United States, 204 F.2d 864, 866
(10th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Caufield, 207 F.2d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Richardson
v. United States, 217 F.2d 696, 698 (8th Cir. 1954) ; Newalk v. United States, 254 F.2d 869,
870 (5th Cir. 1958).
275 Bankey v. Sanford, 74 F. Supp. 756, 757 (N.D. Ga. 1947); Johnston v. United States,
254 F.2d 239, 241 (8th Cir. 1958).
276 Friedman v. United States, 200 F.2d 690, 696 (8th Cir. 1952); Hunt v. United States,
237 F.2d 267, 268 (4th Cir. 1956).
277 Bridges v. United States, 259 F.2d 611, 621 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847
(1958) (dissenting opinion). See also United States v. Trinder, 1 F. Supp. 659 (D. Mont.
1932).
278 Michener v. United States, 170 F.2d 973, 975 (8th Cir. 1948); Berg v. United States,
176 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 876 (1949).
279 Berg v. United States, 176 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 876
(1949); Bloombaum v. United States, 211 F.2d 944, 945 (4th Cir. 1954); United States v.
Sturm, 180 F.2d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1950); Lipscomb v. United States, 226 F.2d 812, 815
(8th Cir. 1955); Bistram v. United States, 253 F.2d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 1958).
280 Berg v United States, 176 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 876 (1949);
United States v. Hoyland, 264 F.2d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 1959).
281 United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1954). But cf. United States v.
Harris, 133 F. Supp. 796, 799 (W. D. Mo. 1955) holding that the rule is different where the
information shows on its face that the statute has run and the statute has no exceptions.
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vacate." 2 But jurisdictional facts are not waived,"' and there is no jurisdiction
if the information sets out an act which is not a federal offense.28s
Where a party charged with having purchased heroin was subjected to an
unlawful search in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments, waived counsel,
and pleaded guilty in ignorance of his constitutional rights, and the court was
without knowledge of the unconstitutional search, the judgment was vacated." 5
But when a defendant pleads guilty while represented by competent counsel of
his own choice, he may not secure a vacation of sentence and judgment where
evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure and a coerced confession
was never used against him.286 The same is true where there is an improper
arrest without a warrant,"' since the manner of arrest and preliminary examina-
tion do not affect the plea.2" If there is any basis for a reasonable apprehension
that the plea resulted from a confession illegally obtained, the plea and sentence
may be vacated. 8 5
Under the-general law of evidence a guilty plea may be admitted in subse-
quent trials as an admission against the defendant who has entered the plea.
290
Furthermore, in any civil action by the government, the doctrine of res judicata
may apply and the judgment entered on the guilty plea may become conclusive
as to the facts alleged in the indictment or information.2 9' Indeed, at times a
282 Smith v. United States, 205 F.2d 768, 770 (10th Cir. 1953); Keto v. United States,
189 F.2d 247, 249 (8th Cir. 1951); Woodring v. United States, 248 F.2d 166, 169 (8th Cir.
1957); Rawley v. United States, 191 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1951); Barnes v. United States,
197 F.2d, 271, 273 (9th Cir. 1952); Collins v. United States, 211 F.2d 789, 791 (8th Cir.
1954); Walker v. United States, 218 F.2d 80, 81 (7th Cir. 1955); Alm v. United States, 238
F.2d 604, 605 (8th Cir. 1956).
283 La Fever v. United States, 257 F.2d 271, 272 (7th Cir. 1958). But in United States
v. Hoyland, 264 F.2d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 1959) the court pointed out that this concept is a
very narrow one and does not cover mere allegation of elements of the crime in the accusation.
It is enough that the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the defendant.
284 Martyn v. United States, 176 F.2d 609, 610 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v. Shaw,
118 F. Supp. 849 (W.D.N.Y. 1954); Hildebrand v. United States, 261 F.2d 354, 355 (9th
Cir. 1958).
285 United States v. Walsh, 89 F. Supp. 409 (D. La. 1949). See note, 55 COLUm. L. REv.
366, 370 (1955).
286 United States v. Sturm, 180 F.2d 413, 415 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 986
(1950) ; Winston v. United States, 224 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Bush, 135 F.
Supp. 3, 4 (S.D.W. Va. 1955). See also Armpriester v. United States, 256 F.2d 294, 296 (4th
Cir. 1958); Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1958); United States v.
Morin, 265 F.2d 241, 245 (3rd Cir. 1959); Richardson v. United States, 199 F.2d 333, 335
(10th Cir. 1952).
287 United States v. Bistram, 153 F. Supp. 816, 818 (D.N.D.), aff'd, 253 F.2d 610, 611
(8th Cir. 1958).
288 Hurst v. United States, 180 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir. 1950).
289 Armpriester v. United States, 256 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1958). Such facts did not
appear in this case.
290 United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. Standard
Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 174 n. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. 162-
10/12 Cases, 138 F. Supp. 820, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Currency, 157 F. Supp.
300, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 1957). See MCCoRmicK, EVIDENCE, § 242 (1954); Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d
1307 (1951).
291 United States v. Wainer, 211 F.2d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 1954); United States v. Bower,
95 F. Supp. 19 (E. D. Tenn. 1951) ; United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp.
907, 909 (D.N.J. 1955); United States v. American Packing Corp., 113 F. Supp. 223, 225
(D.N.J. 1953); United States v. Accardo, 113 F. Supp. 783, 786 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 208 F.2d 632
(3rd. Cir. 1953); United States v. American Precision Products Corp., 115 F. Supp. 823, 826
(D.N.J. 1953); United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 174 n.
32 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
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plea of guilty is given greater scope than is a judgment of conviction after trial,
as where the parties are not the same in the two proceedings.292 But there are
weighty arguments against giving a guilty plea res judicata effect."' In the case
of a conviction after a plea of not guilty, the government has sustained its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. Conviction on a plea of guilty may have resulted
from the defendant's unwillingness to litigate, or a compromise between the
government and the defendant in return for a lesser punishment. As a practical
matter it is difficult to explain the basis of the guilty plea. Making the guilty
plea conclusive may stifle compromise.
A guilty plea may be used as evidence in a subsequent civil action on
the same facts.2" But one court has pointed out that "pleas of guilty must be
construed strictly and must be limited to the narrowest confines consistent with
an intelligent interpretation of the effect thereof." 295
What about the time interval between plea of guilty and sentence? Such
interval is discretionary with the court, hence prompt sentencing is not objection-
able.
29
A failure to require that criminal proceedings be reported in accordance
with statute does not invalidate a judgment based on a plea of guilty.297 Habeas
corpus does not lie, nor a motion to vacate.
F. Plea of Nolo Contendere
The plea of nolo contendere was retained in Rule 11 "to preserve a some-
times useful device by which a defendant may admit his liability to punishment
without being embarrassed in other proceedings." 298 The main, if not the only,
modern purpose of the plea is to avoid exacting an admission which could be
used as an admission in other potential litigation. 9 The plea meets a particular
need in antitrust prosecutions.10
One case referred to a plea of nolo contendere as a "compromise" and as
such a "final settlement." 301 It is intended to insure the defendant a sentence
less than the maximum. It is irrevocable. But this type of reasoning seems
erroneous. 0 2 The trial judge may not fetter his discretion in imposing sentence
292 United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907, 909-910 (D.N.J. 1955).
293 See e.g., 64 HARv. L. REV. 1376 (1951); 50 YALE L. J. 499, 505 (1941).
294 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 243 (1954); United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 922
(2d Cir. 1954) ; United States v. 162-10/12 Cases, 138 F. Supp. 820, 822 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
295 United States v. American Packing Corporation, 113 F. Supp. 223, 225 (D.N.J. 1953).
This was an action by the United States for statutory forfeitures and double damages followed
by a plea of guilty to conspiracy.
296 Bankey v. Sanford, 74 F. Supp. 756, 757 (N.D. Ga. 1947).
297 Bankey v. Sanford, 74 F. Supp. 756, 757-58 (N.D. Ga. 1947). United States v. Christa-
kos, 83 F. Supp. 521, 523 (N.D. Ala. 1949).
298 United States v. Pannell, 178 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1949). The court cited 6 Npw
YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 187-88 (1946). See Note, The
Plea of Nolo Contendere in the Federal Courts, 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 68 (1958).
299 United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 290 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
300 United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n., 136 F. Supp. 212. The court cited
6 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 162, 688 (1946).
301 United States v. Central Supply Association, 74 F. Supp. 388, 389 (N.D. Ohio 1947).
302 61 HARv. L. REv. 888 (1948). It should be noted that guilty pleas also are sometimes
obtained through negotiations between the government and the defendant. Note, 55 COLUM.
L. RaV. 366, 367 n. 4 (1955).
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thereafter. The court should not have articulated the "sporting chance" theory
of jurisprudence.
A plea of nolo contendere requires the consent of the court."' 3 Federal
Rule 20 on transfer for guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere does not change
the provision in Rule 11 that nolo contendere can be pleaded only with the con-
sent of the court."0' Rule 20 is subject to Rule 11 on this issue.
There may be a valid plea of nolo contendere after an express and even
an implied withdrawal of a plea of not guilty."'5
Attorney General Brownell issued a memorandum which was very critical
of the plea of nolo contendere"' It should not be used frequently, particularly
where it is used to avoid certain indirect consequences of pleading guilty, such
as loss of license or sentencing as a multiple offender. Uncontrolled use means
low sentences and insignificant fines which fail to deter crime. The public is led
to believe that the government has onlya technical case. United States Attorneys
should not consent to the plea except in the most unusual circumstances and then
only after approval by the Assistant Attorney General responsible or by the Attor-
ney General. But the memorandum is not binding on the federal courts who
must exercise their discretion."° Where the Attorney General opposed the plea
one court accepted it on the assumption that the Attorney General would advise
the sentencing judge of the exceptionally obnoxious conduct of the defendants
and on the assumption that the Attorney General would proceed with the trial
of the antitrust civil action."08 In another case the court stated that "relative
but by no means controlling weight" should be given to the view of the Attorney
General.0 9 In another case the court accepted the plea even though the govern-
ment objected that there had been four prior convictions on a plea of nolo con-
tendere; the court could look at such convictions in fixing the penalty.310 The
fact that private litigants would lose the benefits of a guilty plea as prima fade
evidence in a civil action was not a reason to refuse the plea. This is particularly
true where a civil action is pending. Congress has enacted no statutes changing
Rule 11. Neither the Clayton Act nor the Sherman Act should be so construed.
A crowded docket is not a ground for accepting the plea. But the benefits to be
derived from a long trial were not sufficient to justify rejection of the plea. Pos-
303 United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 290 (S.D. Cal. 1954). The action of the
court is not reviewable according to G. Aaron Youngquist in 6 NEw YORK UNVmRSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 188 (1946). Compare Mason v. United States, 250 F.2d
704, 706 (10th Gir. 1957).
304 Singleton v. Clemmer, 166 F.2d 963, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
305 Chapman v. United States, 247 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1957).
306 The memorandum is set forth in United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 289 n. 1
(S.D. Cal. 1954) and in 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 68, 76-77 (1958). The plea is defended by G.
Aaron Youngquist in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 162,
188 (1946). Compare the view of Frederick E. Crane, id. at 255-56. The rule is defended by
Judge George Rossman, Arraignment and Preparation for Trial, 5 F.R.D. 63, 66-70 (1946).
In 1953 Nebraska provided for the plea by statute. Note, 33 NEB. L. R.Ev. 428 (1954).
307 United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 290 (S.D. Cal. 1954). In this case the court
accepted the plea as the defendants wished a bar to subsequent civil litigation. See also United
States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n., 136 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
308 United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n., supra note 307.
309 United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
310 United States v. Safeway Stores, 20 F.R.D. 451, 455 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
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sibly one can conclude that the plea in antitrust cases is more likely to be accepted
where a companion civil suit is filed."1'
The penalty on the plea is fixed by the court. It is therefore inappropriate
for the government and the defendant to bargain as to the amount of the fines."12
Occasionally a plea of nolo contendere is rejected. In rejecting such a plea
in an antitrust case, one court pointed out that the factors to be considered are
the nature of the claimed violations, length of persistence therein, defendant's
size and power in the industry, impact of the condemned conduct on the econ-
omy, whether greater deterrent effect will result from an acceptance of the plea,
and the view of the Attorney General. 13 There is no violation of due process
of law when the court refuses to accept a plea.a' The court found it unnecessary
to decide whether a refusal might not in some cases be an abuse of discretion,
and pointed out that the discretion is broad. Bernard Goldflne, over the protest
of the government, was recently permitted to change his plea of not guilty to one
of nolo contendere on a charge of contempt of Congress.31 Possibly the readiness
of the court to accept the plea was affected by the use of eavesdropping by the
government, the heavy financial burden on the defendant in fighting various
proceedings against him estimated at $324,000, and the admission through the
plea that the House Subcommittee could ask questions and require answers. The
government had objected that Goldfine's "willful defiance" of the Committee
should preclude the plea, and that the plea was not a "full vindication" of the
rights of the subcommittee to require answers to their questions. Goldflne was
sentenced to a year's imprisonment and a $1,000 fine, both being suspended.
When the defendant pleads nolo contendere in a prosecution for using pref-
erence ratings to secure quantities of goods greater than the ratings called for,
the defendant cannot make a claim of authority to obtain the goods under other
preference ratings, as this is an attempt at denial, contrary to the admissions of
the plea.3" Evidence on the question of guilt cannot be considered so long as
the plea remains of record. 17
Ordinarily a plea of nolo contendere leaves open for review only the suffi-
ciency of an indictment. " The contention that no offense is charged survives. 1 9
Like a plea of guilty it may be reviewed to determine whether a crime is stated
by the indictment. But in a case of great uncertainty as to the law the defendant
may have an opportunity to make a defense to the indictment. 2 ' Judgment on
311 See 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 68, 73-76 (1958).
312 United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n., 136 F. Supp. 212, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
313 United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y.
1955). Recently Judge Julius H. Miner of Chicago refused to accept a plea of nolo contendere
from Edward A. Hintz to an indictment for contempt of congress growing out of the Hodge
scandal. Chicago Tribune, June 23, 1959, p. 2.
314 Mason v. United States, 250 F.2d 704, 706 (10th Cir. 1957).
315 New York Times, July 17, 1959, p. 1, col. 2.
316 United States v. Bradford, 160 F.2d 729, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331, U.S. 829
(1947).
317 United States v. Gunn, 97 F. Supp. 476, 479 (W.D. Ark. 1950).
318 United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 412 (1947); United
States v. Cosentino, 191 F.2d 574, 575 (7th Cir. 1951); Crolich v. United States, 196 F.2d
879, 881 (5th Cir. 1952).
319 United States v. Bradford, 160 F.2d 729, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 829.
320 United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 411-12 (1947). It
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the plea was reserved until after trial. A plea of nolo contendere to a non-existent
crime is not binding, and a motion to vacate judgment and sentence will lie. 2'
A plea of nolo contendere waives the defendant's demand for a bill of par-
ticulars,322 and it is a waiver of trial by jury. 23
A plea of nolo contendere admits all facts charged in the indictment or in-
formation. 2 It is an admission of guilt for the purposes of the case,323 but it is
not an admission which binds the defendant in a civil action for the same wrong.
For example, in a proceeding to forfeit an automobile and liquor for failure to
pay a special federal tax, the defendant's plea of nolo contendere entered in a
prosecution for failure to pay the special tax could not be considered. 2 A plea
entered by another party in a criminal prosecution involving the-same car cannot
be used in a subsequent civil proceeding of forfeiture. 2' It cannot be used to
establish a charge of civil conspiracy.' Evidence of the plea is not admissable
either as an admission of guilt in a subsequent suit, where the subsequent suit is
based on the same set of facts as the case wherein the plea was used, 29 or if the
subsequent case is based on different facts. 3 '
A plea of nolo contendere is a "conviction" with respect to deportation pro-
ceedings.3 ' An alien applying for a visa must reply affirmatively that he has
been convicted.
The record of conviction of a witness on a plea of nolo contendere is ad-
missible to impeach the witness in a federal civil action for damages for conspir-
ing to violate the antitrust laws. 32 It would not be treated as an admission of
the operative facts in another action. This case represents the law of the state
courts except Alabama, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.3
The Right to Counsel
Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect lays down a
has been pointed out that such cases are very rare. McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252,
254 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956). See 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 68, 70 (1958).
321 United States v. Gallagher, 94 F. Supp. 640, 642 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
322 Kramer v. United States, 166 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1948).
323 United States v. Consentino, 191 F.2d 574, 575 (7th Cir. 1951). See also Lloyd v. Pat-
terson, 242 F.2d 742, 744'(5th Cir. 1957).
324 United States v. Vidaver, 73 F. Supp. 382, 383 (E.D. Va. 1947) ; United States v. Co-
sentino, 191 F.2d 574, 575 (7th Cir. 1951); Harris v. United States, 190 F.2d 503, 505 (10th
Cir. 1951).
325 United States v. Toner, 77 F. Supp. 908, 910 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Singleton v. Clem-
mer, 166 F.2d 963, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1948); United States v. Pannell, 178 F.2d 98, 99 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 927 _(1949).
326 United States v. One Chevrolet Stylemaster Sedan, 91 F. Supp. 272, 275 (D. Colo. 1950).
327 United States v. Plymouth Coupe, 88 F. Supp. 93, 95 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd on other
grounds, 182 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1950).
328 A. B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), appeal dismissed, 197
F.2d 498 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 905 (1952).
329 Mickler v. Fahs, 243 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1957). The second proceeding was an
action by taxpayers to recover income tax deficiencies:
330 Piassick v. United States, 253 F.2d 658, 661, (5th Cir. 1958). Here the second pro-
ceeding was a criminal prosecution.
331 Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 1957). See 2 RUTGERS L. REV.
181, 182 (1948); 33 NEB. L. REv. 428, 431 (1954).
332 Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, 162 F.2d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1947).
333 8 ALA. L. Rav. 399 (1956). See also 33 NEB. L. REv. 428, 432 (1954).
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rule that the court at arraignment advise the defendant of his right to counsel."
4
In one federal case the court pointed out that the state courts of Michigan had
adopted a rule of court expressly requiring the trial judge to advise the defendant
of his right to counsel at arraignment." 5
What is the lawyer's function in connection with pleas? The Supreme Court
has said: "Prior to trial an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make
an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws
involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be
entered."3 '
The defendant has a right under the statutes 37 to conduct his own case and
this includes the right to plead. But this right is not violated when a defendant
answers in the negative the trial judge's question as to whether he wanted to
make a statement before answering the charges against him, and when he told
his attorney appointed by the court that he wanted to plead guilty.3 ' It made
no difference that he had previously stated, in answer to the judge's questions,
that he had no representative and was his own lawyer.
Like the cases before 1946 the cases after that date continue to hold that
absence of counsel at arraignment when the defendant pleads not guilty is not
a basis for release on habeas corpus.3 The Constitution does not require that
the defendant be represented by counsel on arraignment when he pleads not
guilty.34 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has stated: "It has not
been the custom in this jurisdiction to assign counsel upon arraignment if the
plea is not guilty, and we are not advised that it has been the custom in other
jurisdictions." 41
Where the trial court appoints counsel whom the defendant dismisses before
his plea of not guilty, the record of offer, acceptance, and later waiver of counsel
will be sufficient to overcome a defendant's allegations of denial of counsel.34
One case has summarized the prior cases as holding that a plea of guilty
by a defendant not represented by counsel will not be regarded as voluntary if
procured by trick or artifice; or if the defendant, without waiving the assistance
of counsel has been coerced into so pleading; if the plea was entered in complete
334 See Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1957). For cases where such ad-
vice was given see United States v. Christakos, 83 F. Supp. 521, 524-27 (N.D. Ala. 1949);
Ray v. United States, 192 F.2d 658, 659 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v. Von der Heide, 169
F. Supp. 560, 562 (D.D.C. 1959). See Note, 64 YALE L.J. 590, 592 (1955).
335 Von Moltke v. United States, 189 F.2d 56, n.4 (6th Cir. 1951).
336 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948). This was quoted in Gann v. Cough,
79 F. Supp. 912, 916 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
337 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1952).
338 Mayes v. United States, 177 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 1949). It has been concluded that
this case justifies a court in appointing counsel when appropriate even though the defendant
has waived his right to counsel. 55 COLUM. L. REv. 366, 380 (1955). See also Scott v. John-
ston, 71 F. Supp. 117, 120 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
339 Ruben v. Welch, 159 F.2d 493 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 814 (1947); Setser
v. Welch, 159 F.2d 703, 704 (4th Cir. 1947); Holloway v. Welch, 160 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.
1947).
340 Council v. Clenmer, 177 F.2d 22, 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 880 (1949).
A contrary rule "would literally open the doors of all penal institutions of the country." 177
F.2d 22 at 24.
341 Council v. Clemmer, supra note 340.
342 Owens v. Hunter, 169 F.2d 971, 972 (10th Cir. 1948).
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ignorance of the right to counsel; or if the plea was entered in ignorance of the
rights guaranteed by the fourth and fifth amendments. 4
Even where the defendant pleads guilty, the failure to appoint counsel is
not prejudicial where counsel is appointed immediately thereafter and full oppor-
tunity is given to withdraw the pleas, or to take whatever steps are necessary or
desirable without regard to what, had previously transpired. 4 The federal
criminal cases followed a similar ruling of the Supreme Court for state court
cases.3"5 A recent case has held that the failure of the court to inform the de-
fendant of his right to counsel at the time he entered a plea of guilty is cured
when the defendant is represented by counsel at the time of sentence and has
opportunity to move to withdraw his plea but fails to do so. 4'
What about the right to counsel in making a plea of nolo contendere? One
court has stated: "A plea of nolo contendere is an admission of guilt as to all
facts set forth in the indictment and a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and
defenses, except where the plea was entered without advice and aid of counsel." '47
But as pointed out by Professor Fellman:
the better view is that one needs the advice of counsel on the
crucial question of how to plead. Some judges have taken the posi-
tion that how one pleads doesn't matter much because counsels are
always free to change a plea later. However, once a plea of guilty
has been entered, a very damaging admission has been made, and
counsel may be understandably reluctant to try to undo the harm
later by changing the plea. State courts are practically unanimous
in agreeing that the right to counsel accrues at arraignment. 34
In at least one case the Supreme Court spoke very broadly as to the right
to counsel at arraignment and plea. The trial judge had assigned a young lawyer
for arraignment purposes only. The lawyer spent a few moments with the
defendant and recommended that she stand mute, which she did. A plea of
not guilty was entered and she was remanded to custody. Counsel had never
seen the indictment. Later, still without counsel of her own choice or without
counsel having been assigned to her as promised by the judge, she changed her
plea to guilty after receiving incorrect advice from an F.B.I. agent who was a
lawyer. Justice Black stated "Arraignment is too important a step in a criminal
proceeding to give such wholly inadequate representation to one charged with
a crime.""" There should be no "hollow compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution at a stage so important as arraignment." Perhaps the case can be
reconciled with earlier lower court decisions on the basis that the defendant was
not promptly supplied with counsel following arraignment so that she made her
343 United States v. Sturm, 180 F.2d 413, 416 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 896 (1950).
(1950).
344 Hiatt v. Gann, 170 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1948), reversing Gann. v. Gough, 79 F. Supp.
912, 916 (N.D. Ga. 1948); Council v. Clemmer, 117 F.2d 22, 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 880 (1949).
345 Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 85 (1946).
346 Young v. United States, 228 F.2d 693, 694 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 913 (1956).
(1956).
347 United States v. Gallagher, 94 F. Supp. 640, 641 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
348 FELLMAx, THE DEFENDANT'S IGHTS, 123 (1958).
349 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 (1948). See Baiter, "Assignment of Counsel
in Federal Courts to Defend Indigents Accused of Crime," 24 CALIF. B. J. 114, 117 (1948);
Note, 22 TEMP. L. Q. 140 (1948).
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subsequent guilty plea without representation by counsel."'0 Counsel was only
appointed at a time when it was too late to move to withdraw the guilty plea.
At the present time possibly the result would be different as the defendant has
more time to withdraw his plea of guilty. It should be noted that the right to
counsel when the defendant pleads guilty does not extend to a motion to vacate
under 28 U.S.C. section 2255.351 But this may be dubious as a motion to with-
draw a guilty plea under Rule 32 (d) seems to overlap with a motion to vacate." 2
In a case in which the defendant tried to withdraw his plea of guilty after receiv-
ing a four-year sentence, but leave was denied and the defendant's request that
the court appoint counsel to prepare a writ of habeas corpus was also denied,
and the court then sentenced the defendant to five years, without appointing
counsel, such procedure was held to violate due process and the right to counsel. 3 '
Possibly this case may be construed as saying only that there is a right to counsel
at the second sentencing, rather than as to withdrawal of the plea.
A defendant may plead guilty without counsel when he waives representa-
tion by counsel.3 4 Until 1938 there was no uniform practice to have the orders
show the judge's conclusion that there had been a competent waiver of counsel. 55
A defendant may enter a valid plea of guilty without the assistance of
counsel. 56 But a waiver of the constitutional right to assistance is just as im-
portant as waiver when the defendant pleads not guilty. 5 ' When a defendant
waives counsel, the court should not accept his plea of guilty without first advising
him, fully and not merely perfunctorily, as to the nature of the charges and his
rights with respect to them, and ascertaining that his plea is intelligently and
understandingly made.33 " There is an adequate waiver when the defendant is
advised in open court that he could waive such right as he wished and proceed
without an attorney. 50 The court need not appoint counsel to advise the de-
fendant whether to waive counsel. 6 ' Merely telling the defendant in general
terms of his right to counsel is not sufficient.36' The right to receive appointed
counsel must be spelled out. Waiver was found in one case as to a defendant
350 Three dissenting members of the court pointed out that the procedure at arraignment
was not prejudicial as a plea of not guilty was entered when the defendant stood mute. Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 731, 732 (1948).
351 Crowe v. United States, 175 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950
(1950); United States v. Caufleld, 207 F.2d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Richardson v. United
States, 199 F.2d 333, 335 (10th air. 1952) ; Vinson v. United States, 235 F.2d 120, 122 (6th
Cir. 1956); Tubbs v. United States, 249 F.2d 37, 38 (10th Cir. 1957). See Orfield, New Trial
in Federal Criminal Cases, 2 VILL. L. REv. 293, 361 (1957).
352 Notes, 55 'COLUra. L. REv. 366, 367 (1955) ; 64 YALE L. J. 590 (1955). If the writ of
error coram nobis is used, arguably there is a clearer right to counsel as the writ is regarded
as a stop in a criminal proceeding. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
353 United States ex rel Stidham v. Swope, 96 F. Supp. 773 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
354 Hunt v. United States, 237 F.2d 267, 268 (4th Cir. 1956). Snell v. United States, 174
F.2d 580, 581 (10th Cir. 1949); Caldwell v. Hunter, 163 F.2d 181, 182 (10th 'Cir. 1947).
As to withdrawal of waiver of counsel see 34 WAsH. L. REv. 181 (1959).
355 United States v. Morgan, 246 U.S. 502, 512 (1954).
356 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 161 F.2d 113, 116 (6th Cir. 1947), affirming Ex parte Von Molt-
ke, 72 F. Supp. 994, 996 (E.D. Mich. 1946); Bradley v. United States, 262 F.2d 679, 680
(10th Cir. 1959).
357 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948).
358 Smith v. United States, 238 F.2d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1956).
359 Bradley v. United States, 262 F.2d 679, 680 (10th Cir. 1959).
360 United States v. Christakos, 83 F. Supp. 521, 525 (N.D. Ala. 1949).
361 United States v. Wantland, 199 F.2d 237, 238 (7th Cir. 1952).
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who had a record of previous convictions where there was some evidence of an
offer of counsel though nothing appeared on the record. 62  If no one can con-
tradict the claims of the defendant a silent record may work in his favor to show
no waiver."' Where the evidence is conflicting concerning advice and offer of
counsel, and the record is silent, it is to be assumed that there was no advice and
no waiver." 4 If the record shows insufficient advice before the waiver and plea
of guilty were accepted, neither is valid.6 ' If there has been undue haste, even
a written waiver may not be binding.3 6 6 And it is the duty of the judge to ascer-
tain the fullness of the defendant's understanding by thorough questioning before
accepting a waiver of counsel. The usual rule is that the written waiver and
the recitals in the record will be held conclusive.6 ' In 1954 the Supreme Court
stated: "Of course, the absence of a showing of waiver from the record does not
of itself invalidate a judgment. * It is presumed the proceedings were correct and
the burden rests on the defendant to show otherwise." 3 6 8
A defendant was held not to have waived his right to counsel even though
he responded in the negative when he was asked by the court whether he desired
counsel when the court failed to explain the second offender penalties involved. 69
Where a United States Attorney states that the defendant was denied effective
assertion of counsel at arraignment and on entry of a guilty plea, a motion to
vacate the sentence should be granted.
3 70
In 1944 it was held for the first time in a federal court that the writ of error
coram nobis could be used on the ground that the defendant pleaded guilty
without being advised of his right to counsel and without waiving his right 3 7 1
In 1946 coram nobis was granted to determine the defendant's mental com-
petency to waive counsel and plead guilty." 2 But the Seventh Circuit denied
relief on the grounds of delay, the absence of an averment of innocence or a
showing of any defense or a showing that judgment would have been different
if he had had counsel. 73 The Fourth Circuit thought it a proper ground for
relief.
3 7 4
362 Scott v. Johnston, 71 F. Supp. 117, 120 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
363 Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866, 868 (N.D. Ill. 1952). This case is criticized
as extreme in BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN AmRICAN COURTS 70 (1955).
364 Richardson v. Shuttleworth, 75 F. Supp. 631, 634 (E.D. Mich. 1948).
365 Cherrie v. United States, 179 F.2d 94, 95 (10th Cir. 1949). On remand the trial court
found that other facts not appearing on the record indicated a competent waiver, and this
finding was upheld on appeal. Cherrie v. United States, 184 F.2d 384, 385 (10th Cir. 1950).
366 Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d 580, 581 (10th Cir. 1949).
367 Caldwell v. Hunter, 163 F.2d 181, 182 (10th Cir. 1947); Bankey v. Sanford, 74 F.
Supp. 756, 757 (N.D. Ga. 1947).
368 United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954). Compare the holdings in state
court cases. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8
DE PAUL L. REv. 213, 226-30 (1959).
369 Gannon v. United States, 208 F.2d 772, 773-74 (6th Cir. 1953). See also 64 YALE
L. J. 590, 596-97 (1955); 55 COLUIT. L. REV. 366, 375 (1955).
370 Edick v. United States, 264 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1959).
371 United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 441 (3rd. Cir. 1944). Judge Biggs in a con-
curring opinion relied on the "All Writs" section of the Judicial Code. See also United States
v. Mahoney, 43 F. Supp. 943 (W.D. La. 1942); 1955 U. ILL. L. F. 617, 618.
372 Roberts v. United States, 158 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1946).
373 United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102, 104 (7th Cir. 1948). Accord, United States v.
Rockower, 171- F.2d 423, 425 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Morris, 83 F. Supp. 970
(D.D.C 1949). Farnsworth v. United States, 198 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1952); United States
v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1953).
374 Crowe v. United-States, 169 F.2d 1022, 1023 (4th Cir. 1948).
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In 1954 the Supreme Court definitely upheld the use of the writ of error
coram nobis in federal criminal cases. It could be used to vacate a federal con-
viction based on a guilty plea on the ground that the defendant was not given
the right to counsel and had not waived the right.3' 5  The defendant could have
such relief even though he was not in federal custody. The writ is now frequently
sought by defendants charged with multiple offenses in state courts who are
burdened with more severe penalties because of a federal conviction alleged
to be erroneous.
Following the decision of the Supreme Court there have been many decisions
applying and construing it. The defendant must make a direct allegation of the
absence of intelligent waiver of counsel.' The doctrine of laches probably does
not apply.377 But in 1957 a district court denied relief where there was an un-
explained delay of twenty-two years.378 The court of appeals affirmed.7 9 The
defendant was only eighteen at the time of his plea and the trial judge and all
others who might show waiver were dead.
Neither the defendant's failure to prove his innocence nor long delay before
asserting his rights bar a petition for the writ of error corarn nobis to invalidate
a federal conviction based on a plea of guilty entered without aid of counsel."
Where the records show waiver of counsel and entry of a plea of guilty, coram
nobis does not lie.38' If a defendant pleads guilty without requesting assistance
of counsel, his waiver of counsel must be intelligent to be effective." z  Coram
nobis was allowed to a boy of eighteen who had not intelligently waived assistance
of counsel. 33 Coram nobis was denied when the defendant failed to show alleged
insanity as barring a waiver of counsel.8 4 Coram nobis does not lie merely
because the clerk's records do not contain the name of counsel assigned to the
defendant.8" It is better practice that the hearing on the writ of error coram
nobis be before a district judge rather than the one who received the plea if the
latter is a material witness. 8 If the record shows representation, the writ does
not lie.3" The same is true where the evidence at the hearing on the writ shows
375 United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954). See also 53 COLUM. L. REv. 737
(1953); 66 HARv. L. REv. 1137 (1953); 63 YALE L. J. 115 (1953).
376 Gordon v. United States, 216 F.2d 495, 497 (5th Cir. 1954).
377 Gordon v. United States, supra note 376; Haywood v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 485,
487 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
378 United States v. Urrutia, 160 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Fla. 1957).
379 Urrutia v. United States, 253 F.2d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 1958).
380 United States v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1955), noted 1955 U. ILL. L. F.
617; Farnsworth v. United States, 232 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1956). This case was criticized 45
GEo.L.J. 127 (1957) for possibly implying that when the record is silent on waiver, the onus
is on the government to establish it.
381 United States v. Day, 232 F.2d 627 (3rd Cir. 1956); United States v. Halley, 240 F.2d
418 (2d Cir. 1957).
382 United States v. Nickerson, 124 F. Supp. 35, 37 (D. Mass. 1954). Defendant was twen-
ty-four and had never completed grammar school. Conviction was in 1935. See also Shelton
v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 112 (5th Cir. 1957).
383 United States v. Vargas, 124 F. Supp. 195 (D. Puerto Rico 1954). Conviction was in
1939.
384 United States v. King, 128 F. Supp. 664, 667 (D. Wyo. 1955); United States v. Rus-
sell, 146 F. Supp. 102, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (drugs).
385 Haywood v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Nor does it lie because
the records are silent as to counsel and waiver. United States v. Russell, 146 F. Supp. 102, 103
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
386 United States v. Halley, 240 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1957).
387 United States v. Deutsch, 151 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
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representation."' 9 One case has suggested that the defendant must show that
a retrial would have a different result.8 9 The weight to be attributed to the
testimony of various witnesses can best be determined upon a hearing." '
If the defendant is in federal custody a motion under 28 U.S.C. section 2255
will be granted on about the same principles as the writ of error coram nobis. 91
The requirement that a defendant have effective assistance of counsel does
not require on a motion to vacate that the court ascertain whether the personally
selected counsel was well qualified in the performance of his duty."9 2 Retained
counsel for a defendant was found not to have acted incompetently when he
advised the defendant after a mistrial to plead guilty because the case could be
won on appeal, the case against the defendant being strong and the sentence
light. 93  A plea of guilty is not invalidated because the defendant relied on an
incorrect representation of his attorney that conviction could not subject him to
deportation. 94 The advice was as to merely a "collateral consequence" of the
plea. A motion to vacate does not lie unless the failure of counsel makes the
proceeding a "mockery of justice." 99
With respect to the competency of counsel appointed by the trial court, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals has said on a motion to vacate that mere
improvident strategy, bad tactics, carelessness or inexperience do not necessarily
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. 99 The mere fact that counsel might
have moved to suppress evidence obtained by alleged illegal search and seizure
and illegal confessions does not show ineffective assistance of counsel which would
justify vacating a plea of guilty. Ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial
except perhaps to the extent that it bears on the issues of voluntariness and under-
standing. 9 The Second Circuit has held that the fact that the defendant con-
ferred with court appointed counsel for about fifteen minutes between counsel's
assignment and the time when the case was to be tried did not show inadequate
representation where the belief of counsel that defendant's acts were within the
388 United States v. Norton, 234 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1956).
389 Dunn v. United States, 238 F.2d 908, 91 (6th Cir. 1956). Here the defendant pleaded
not guilty; and had adequate representation of counsel of his own choice.
390 United States v. Capsopa, 260 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1958). The trial court had denied
a hearing. See also Kyle v. United States, 263 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1959).
391 Orfield, New Trial in Federal Criminal Cases, 2 ViLL. L. Rv. 293, 360 (1957); 20
A.L.R. 2d 976, 979, 982, 988 (1951).
392 Kennedy v. United States, 259 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1958). See also United States
v. Miller, 254 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1958).
393 Moore v. United States, 249 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also Moss v. Hunter, 167
F.2d 683, 684 (10th Cir. 1948); Merritt v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 739, 741 (10th Cir. 1948);
Kinney v. United States, 177 F.2d 895, 897 (10th Cir. 1949); Loiseau v. United States, 177
F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1949). But assurance by counsel, whether baseless or unreasonably
based in the remarks of some official that a plea of guilty will result in a reduced sentence may
be evidence of incompetence. See United States v. Schneer, 105 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1951);
Note, 55 COLubi. L. Rav. 366, 378 (1955).
394 United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954);
55 COLUM. L. Rav. 366, 377 (1955), 22 U. CH. L. REV. 730, 734 (1955); 64 YALE L.J.
590, 597 (1955).
395 United States v. Miller, 254 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1958).
396 Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1958). One judge dissented.
See the case below, 152 F. Supp. 179, 185 (D.C. 1957). See also Jones v. United States, 258
F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Smith v. United States, 265 F.2d 99, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
Note, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 366, 377 (1955).
397 Edwards v. United States, supra note 396, at 709-10. Compare Hurst v. United States,
180 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1950).
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prohibition of the statute was correct."' 8 There is no inadequacy unless the rep-
resentation turns the proceeding into a farce and mockery of justice. 9 Advice
to plead guilty without more does not prove incompetence."' Whenever the
court in good faith appoints or accepts the appearance of a member of the bar
in good standing to represent the defendant, the presumption is that such counsel
is competent."' Recently the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a hearing
to determine adequacy of representation where it appeared that counsel advised
the defendant to plead guilty in ignorance of material facts and after very brief
preparation 0 2
IV. MODERN REFORM PROPOSALS
Rule 24 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure drafted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform state laws and approved by
the American Bar Association in 1952 is entitled "Pleas" and provides:
The defendant may plead not guilty, [not guilty by reason of
insanity as provided by statute], guilty, [or with the consent of the
court, nolo contendere]. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining of
record that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court
refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a corporation fails to appear,
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court may strike out
a plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty, if it deems such action
necessary in the interest of justice.
The commentary pointed out that this rule was based in part on Rule 11
of the Federal Criminal Rules and Sections 208, 221, and 223-226 of the Amer-
ican Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure. Statutes in several states
authorize a special plea of guilty by reason of insanity. The plea of nolo con-
tendere is not recognized in some states and is therefore bracketed. It serves a
useful purpose. Rule 26 of the Uniform Rules provides for notice of alibi. The
Supreme Court of the United States rejected an alibi rule prepared by its Ad-
visory Committee."0 ' It is the policy of the Federal Criminal Rules to require
very little affirmative pleading of the defendant.0 ' The plea of not guilty is very
broad. Under it the defendant may plead insanity, alibi, entrapment, self-defense,
and many other defenses. The prosecution is already so powerful that cutting
398 United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 378 (2d Cir. 1949). See also Vega-Murrillo v.
United States, 247 F.2d 735, 737 (9th Cir. 1957); Thornburg v. United States, 164 F.2d
37, 39 (10th Cir. 1947).
399 Baldwin v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 310, 315 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
400 Maye v. Pescor, 162 F.2d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1947); Shepherd v. Hunter, 163 F.2d
872, 873 (10th Cir. 1947).
401 United States v. Bloom, 144 F. Supp. 808, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
402 Kyle v. United States, 263 F.2d-657, 660 (9th Cir. 1959). Defendant proceeded by
writ of error coram nobis.
403 Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 215-16.
404 For a discussion of affirmative pleading see ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM AR-
REST TO APPEAL 303-15 (1947). Affirmative pleading is advocated by Berge, Some Comments
on the Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 34 J. CRIMINAL L., C. & P. S. 222, 224
(1944); Berge, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 353, 366
(1943); Harno, Proposed Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure: Final Draft, 42 MIcE. L. REv.
623, 628 (1944).
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down the scope of the not guilty plea seems unnecessary. While the prosecution
may occasionally be inconvenienced by surprise, so may the defendant. The
prosecution need not disclose in advance of trial the names and addresses of its
witnesses nor the evidence upon which it proposes to rely. Some variances in
proof are permitted. The defendant's rights to a deposition under Rule 15 and
to discovery under Rule 16 are narrow in scope.
